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“Auditing is more about securing orders than 
improving the welfare of the workers, that is why 
the management only make cosmetic changes 
to impress the auditors and not to better the 
conditions of workers.” Worker, Factory A, Kenya, producing 
for Wal-Mart and Sears  “Before you came, I have been 
interviewed by at least three different people and 
they all asked me if I was a contract employee 
or a regular one. If they were auditors and have 
not taken any concrete steps about it then it is 
quite useless.” Worker, Factory C, Pakistan,  producing for 
KarstadtQuelle, C&A, Disney and Wal-Mart  “Whenever social 
auditors come to this factory, we are given holiday.” 
Worker, Factory C, India, producing for KarstadtQuelle, Kingel, Derma 
Group, Otto, Spiegel and Littlewoods  “New or young looking 
workers would be arranged for paid leave during
the audit lest they did not behave properly during 
the audit.” Research on Factory C in China, producing for 
Warner Bros, Hatland and the Beijing Olympic Committee  “All the 
twenty-one workers interviewed ... said that no 
improvements had been made in the health and 
safety situation in the factory since they joined the 
factory.” Research report from SA8000-accredited factory, north 
India, producing for BCL, Saki and RCC
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This report is the result of a collaborative research effort, coordinated by the inter-
national secretariat of the Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC). CCC international part-
ner organisations (trade unions and non-governmental organisations) have strongly 
pushed for better information on developments related to “social auditing”, the most 
commonly-used tool to determine compliance with codes of conduct in workplaces 
where garments and sports shoes are produced. The CCC believes that this informa-
tion is also of value to employers and buyers who have also expressed a need to 
break the deadlock surrounding discussions related to social auditing. This need for 
better-informed debate comes against a backdrop of only limited progress in improving 
conditions for workers in garment and sport shoe industry supply chains, in spite of a 
decade and a half of campaigning for change, and the continued use of social auditing 
by many companies to help present themselves as socially responsible. 
 In 2004 terms of reference for a multi-country research project into the state of social 
auditing were developed by the CCC International Secretariat. In 2005 research was 
commissioned to take place in nine countries where substantial garment and sports 
shoe production takes place.
All of the country-level research cited in the following chapters was carried out by local 
organisations from the CCC partner network with long-term experience in working with 
workers in supply chains. For this reason, the report highlights not only the views and 
experiences of workers, but also the expert opinions of the research organisations. 
The researchers followed a common research framework though there was some ﬂex-
ibility in choosing factories and designing interview questions.
In addition the views of managers and auditors were sought. The researchers found 
it was difﬁcult to obtain interviews with managers and social auditors. Where the 
researchers succeeded in interviewing managers in most cases the managers asked 
that their names and factories be kept conﬁdential. The few social auditors that grant-
ed interviews to the researchers made the same request. 
670 workers from around 40 factories in Bangladesh, China, Kenya, India, Indonesia, 
Morocco, Pakistan and Romania, participated in the research through focus groups 
and interviews. It should be noted that among workers in the industry, there is a  
climate of fear surrounding discussing working conditions.
The workers interviewed often overcame anxieties about revealing workplace informa-
tion and more often than not, in an industry riddled with overtime abuses, used up 
precious hours of free time. This note from the Bangladeshi researchers about the  
56 workers interviewed gives a ﬂavour of the sacriﬁce involved:
To have adequate time from the workers was a challenging task in conducting this 
study and almost all the time study team members had to hurry to free the respond-
ents as they could give time only after their long working hours. After working for a long 
period workers become extremely tired, although the study team noted that workers 
tried to provide as much time as they could. Some of the respondents were interviewed 
at 9:00 p.m. before going to the factory for night shift work but were quite busy to do 
their household work as well as to take necessary preparation to go to the factory for 
night work. 
8
 10 11In this report we have kept the names of the workers, managers and social auditors conﬁdential as was requested by some of the workers, researchers, managers and social auditors, out of fear for repercussions, loss of orders or loss of auditing  
assignments. 
The CCC partner organisations involved in this research were:
3 Centre for Education and Communication (CEC), India
3 Kenya Human Rights Commission, Kenya
3 Org. “AUR” - National Association of Human Resources Specialists (ANSRU),  
Romania
3 Alternative Movement for Resources and Freedom Society (AMRF Society),  
Bangladesh
3 Pakistan Institute of Labour Education and Research (PILER), Pakistan
3 Social Awareness and Voluntary Education (SAVE), India
3 Association Attawassoul and Saâd Belghazi, Morocco
3 Urban Community Mission (UCM), Indonesia
3 Labour Action China, Hong Kong
The CCC and its partners are conﬁdent that this research will contribute to ongoing 
reﬂection on how to improve practice and policy surrounding the use of social auditing, 
and more broadly, on approaches to improving life for workers in garment and sports 
shoe industry supply chains. 
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 12 13INTRODUCTIONSocial audits to check working conditions in production facili-
ties emerged in the mid-1990s after a number of high proﬁle 
companies were widely scrutinized for substandard working 
conditions in their supply chains. At that time, a growing 
number of companies—for example Nike, Gap, Levi Strauss, 
and C&A—had adopted codes of conduct that in essence 
were pledges to prevent exploitation and abuse of workers 
producing their goods. Labour advocates soon challenged 
these companies to demonstrate conformity to the standards 
they had adopted. Calls for independent, civil society based 
forms of workplace assessments were made. 
The large majority of companies ignored these calls and 
actually did very little to implement or enforce their codes 
of conduct. A few companies, however, started to use social 
audit ﬁrms to inspect workplaces. This was met with little 
enthusiasm from labour rights activists who suspected that 
social audits were undertaken mainly to deceive the public. 
Others questioned the effectiveness of the audits or feared 
that social audits were mainly carried out as a form of risk 
assessment. 
Many of these fears were validated when researchers and 
journalists reported on important ﬂaws in social auditing 
methods. They found that social audits typically failed to de-
tect important instances of non-compliance with labour stand-
ards. Workplaces that social auditors found to be in compli-
ance with standards were in fact no more than sweatshops.1 
One decade down the road much has changed and yet stayed 
the same. 
Social audits have become a burgeoning practice within the 
garment and sportswear industry. Tens of thousands of social 
audits are commissioned annually by hundreds of brand-name 
companies (“brands”) or retailers. A whole industry of com-
mercial social auditors, self-assigned experts, and quasi- 
independent ethical enterprises has jumped on the social 
audit bandwagon (see chapter 4).  
On the positive side a number of companies have learned 
from their own experiences as well as from the critics. They 
have started to identify the limitations of social auditing 
methods and have moved in the direction of a more com-
prehensive approach to improve working conditions. These 
ﬁrms recognise the need for an overarching system to evalu-
ate company claims and to rise above the limits of corporate self-regulation. A few 
multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) have been set up that bring together a variety of 
business interests, NGOs and/or trade unions to try to develop (more) systematic 
approaches to code implementation, monitoring and veriﬁcation, as well as develop-
ing structures for accountability to civil society. This report will argue that only social 
audits embedded in a comprehensive range of actions can be useful. These other 
actions are covered in more detail in chapter 6. 
Unfortunately, this comprehensive approach stands in sharp contrast with the current 
standard practice of social auditing still utilised by many of the biggest players in the 
industry. 
As this report will show, the non-specialist retail sector (supermarkets, discount and 
department stores) and mail order sectors and in particular are developing less strin-
gent models to implement codes of conduct.
It is in those contexts that unbranded retailers have managed to escape scrutiny, and 
as a result have felt less pressure to behave in a responsible way toward the workers 
employed in their supply chains. The social audit methods used by retailers such as 
KarstadtQuelle (Germany) or Wal-Mart (United States). in fact are based on a seri-
ously ﬂawed model largely discredited not only by labour rights advocates but also 
by those within the industry who have had a longer-term involvement in this ﬁeld but 
on an extended scale. The impact of these programmes on working conditions is at 
best superﬁcial. Their approach seems for the most part to be minimalist—they tend 
to invest as little time and money as possible, and more worryingly, they seem to be 
promoting a “lowering of the bar”, in order to make it easier to tell consumers that 
they are meeting goals for treating workers responsibly. A Chinese NGO identiﬁed this 
phenomenon in interviews with managers in China:
The level of enthusiasm in implementing CSR among brand-name companies far ex-
ceeds that of retailers. Factory managers said that in the in-house veriﬁcation person-
nel and independent auditors sent by brand-name companies investigated problems 
quite thoroughly and could not easily be fobbed off. Checks by retailers, however, were 
generally a little more lax. Workers…could clearly remember investigators from H&M 
and New Look coming to their dormitories to interview them. Managers in two factories 
said that Wal-Mart’s social responsibility inspection team only spends about three hours 
at the factories, during which they verify wages, working hours and personnel records, 
make a brief inspection tour of the factory, and meet three or four workers in the fac-
tory ofﬁce’s reception room. They also said that Wal-Mart inspections were generally 
quite easy to bluff, and that because Wal-Mart’s unit prices for orders are extremely low, 
their inspection teams were not likely to seriously demand that the factory adhere to 
the code of practice.2
In some cases, these companies fail to address, or turn a blind eye, to extreme abus-
es of workers, such as was the case in Bangladesh in April, when Spectrum Sweater 
collapsed killing 64 workers. Workers report that their employers had made their lives 
hell before the disaster. Workers were held in such low regard that their attempts to 
raise the alarm about dangerous conditions prior to the collapse were simply ignored, 
“I remember the time when there was a 
union in this factory…in the beginning 
of 2000… At that time our working 
conditions were very bad. Not that they 
are any better now. We used to get 
absolutely dirty water to drink… we 
never had any appointment letter… 
we were forced to do overtime. These 
were the things that we demand should 
be corrected…. But the management 
succeeded in breaking the union.” 
Worker, Factory A, north India,  
SA8000-certiﬁed, producing for BCL,  
Saki and RCC.
“I have been working (here) for more 
than a year. Auditors visit the factory 
but there is no visible change in our 
working conditions... I have been having 
a constant leg pain since I joined. I have 
complained to the supervisors but have 
not got time off to see the doctor.”
Worker, Factory D, north India, producing 
for Wal-Mart, Kellwood and Sears
Workers’ 
Quotes
 14 15not just by factory management but by clients as well. The factory had undergone at least one social audit by Carrefour and had undergone a “quality audit” by KarstadtQuelle report-
edly done by international social auditing ﬁrm SGS. 
This report is a critical assessment of the social audit system 
adopted by these kind of companies.
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 look at the ways in which factory 
owners prepare for audits, worker perceptions of the process, 
and the perceived impact of audits on working conditions. It 
covers in some detail, using new ﬁeld research, why social au-
diting is not achieving as much as was hoped, in spite of sig-
niﬁcant discussion over the last 10 years by researchers, jour-
nalists and activists3 about whether social audits can accu-
rately assess labour conditions and encourage improvements. 
In spite of this discussion, and in light of the evidence in this 
report, it is clear that mainstream social auditing consistently 
manages to miss crucial violations of workplace rights, in 
particular regarding as “intangible” areas such as freedom of 
association, working hours, abuse and harassment.
Chapter 4 looks at the global social auditing industry and as-
sesses its successes and failings over a decade of existence. 
Chapter 5 considers current problematic trends toward over-
reliance on social auditing, and chapter 6 makes a series of 
recommendations for companies and social auditors. 
This research draws a number of key conclusions:
1. Social audits are failing to deliver as a tool for assessing 
code compliance, particularly in determining violations of 
freedom of association, excessive and forced overtime, 
abusive treatment and discrimination of workers.
2. Workers and their organisations are marginalized in the 
social audit process. Without their full participation in the 
auditing process their concerns, particularly gender- 
related concerns, are missed. Relevant local stakehold-
ers outside the factory such as trade unions and wom-
en’s and labour NGOs are rarely consulted or involved. 
3. Social auditors are making it too easy for workplaces to 
receive positive evaluations, particularly by announcing 
audit visits in advance, thereby giving factory managers 
time to prepare for audits and convey a false impression 
of working conditions.
4. Factory managers are deceiving social auditors in many ways, most notably by 
coaching workers before they are interviewed by auditors to convey false or incom-
plete information and by falsifying records.
5. Social audits are usually too short, too superﬁcial and too sloppy to identify cer-
tain types of code violations.
6. Workers are badly informed about their rights, often too scared for their own jobs 
to speak up about problems during audits, and generally do not have the possibil-
ity to ﬁle a complaint. 
7. The vast majority of social audits is conducted by global ﬁrms whose staff is 
generally unskilled and inexperienced to do the job, and whose business model 
conﬂicts with the requirements for credible, independent social auditing. 
8. Audits are often not followed by effective remediation. Improvements at the work-
place are limited to health and safety issues and tend to be superﬁcial. 
9. The audit industry is closed and secretive, preventing serious discussion about 
its policy and practices and possible improvements to its methods.
10. Certain buyers, particularly well-known brands that have been targeted by labour 
rights campaigns, and those cooperating more intensively with labour advocates 
are actually doing a better job in developing more comprehensive and participa-
tory social audit models. Others, mainly unbranded buyers and non-specialised 
retailers, are promoting the failing audit model described in this report, particu-
larly in the context of fast growing business dominated CSR initiatives.
There are a number of ways in which the CCC believes that companies that are seri-
ous about respecting workers’ rights can get on the right track (described in detail in 
chapter 6):
Place workers at the centre of social auditing processes. Recognizing that the majority 
of workers in this industry are women all auditing procedures must be gender sensi-
tive. Gender blind auditing is bound to miss out on key input from workers. Workers 
are the intended beneﬁciaries of audits therefore their input is not sought out and 
included in auditing and associated processes (remediation) such efforts will not con-
tribute to sustainable improvements to their labour conditions. Training and education 
is a precursor for creating an atmosphere where workers are informed of their rights 
and can effectively use channels intended for conveying concerns.
Sourcing companies must adopt a more comprehensive “toolbox” approach if they 
want to make a credible effort to face up to their responsibilities to workers in their 
supply chains. Quality social auditing includes unannounced visits, interviews of work-
ers outside of the workplace and involves skilled local experts and civil society organi-
zations. This alone however is not enough and should be combined with other tools 
in a broader and longer-term program to address and remediate violations of workers 
rights. Including partnership with local organizations; grievance and complaints mecha-
“Auditing is more about securing orders 
than improving the welfare of the 
workers, that is why the management 
only make cosmetic changes to 
impress the auditors and not to better 
the conditions of workers.…” 
Worker, Factory A, Kenya, producing for 
Wal-Mart and Sears
“Before you came, I have been 
interviewed by at least three different 
people and they all asked me if I was a 
contract employee or a regular one. If 
they were auditors and have not taken 
any concrete steps about it then it is 
quite useless.”
Worker, Factory C, Pakistan, audited 
under the AVE scheme, and producing 
for KarstadtQuelle, C&A, Disney and 
Wal-Mart
“All the twenty-one workers interviewed 
… said that no improvements had been 
made in the health and safety situation 
in the factory since they joined the 
factory.” 
Research report from SA8000-
accredited factory, north India, 
producing for BCL, Saki and RCC
Workers’ 
Quotes
 17nisms; education and training; a pro-active approach to freedom of association; address existing business or purchasing prac-tices; effective remediation and increased transparency. 
Systematic problems at both the point of production and the 
point of consumption can only be successfully addressed 
through an industry-wide approach. Playing an active role in 
credible multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) can also be a valu-
able step for companies to take in improving their auditing and 
other code compliance work. 
“The pieces for which workers used to get 
rs100 in 1999, we are still getting about 
90 or 100 rupees. At present in many 
pieces they are reducing the rate to 40 to 
45 rupees.”
Md Ateeq, president, Delhi Leather 
Karigar Sangathan Trade Union, India
“Workers do not see any improvement in 
signiﬁcant areas such as the wage and 
working hours despite repeated factory 
audits and worker interviews. They have 
a sense of distrust and feel that the 
standards and auditing is completely 
irrelevant to their everyday working life at 
the workplace.” 
Researcher reporting on SA8000-
accredited factory in southern China 
producing for DKNY, Just Perfect and 
Michael Kors
02
Cheating 
and sloppy 
auditing
Workers’ 
Quotes
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 18 Whenever social auditors come to this factory, we are given holiday. Worker on a piece rate working under a subcontrac-tor 4  within Factory C in India, producing for KarstadtQuelle, 
Kingel, Derma Group, Otto, Spiegel and Littlewoods
Over the last 15 years, the plight of workers in the supply 
chains of apparel and sports shoe companies has become a 
cause for public concern. In attempts to avoid scandals and 
reassure consumers that they take their responsibilities seri-
ously, some companies are relying increasingly, to the tune of 
thousands of audits each year, on social auditing to monitor 
or investigate the conditions endured by workers in their sup-
ply chains. 
Social audits are meant to help identify workers’ rights 
violations in production facilities, to assess and evaluate 
suppliers’ performance in relation to social standards and 
encourage improvements at the work place. They cannot, by 
themselves, create change. At the same time, ﬂawed auditing 
can have the opposite effect by providing a false or incom-
plete picture of working conditions at a production site. Much, 
therefore, depends on the quality and scope of an audit.
This chapter presents information on recent social auditing in 
factories in Kenya, India, China, Pakistan, Romania, Bangla-
desh, Morocco and Indonesia gathered by local organisations 
in 2005 speciﬁcally for this report. This information is sup-
plemented by references to other research. Areas considered 
include:
3 the growing practice of factory managers deceiving  
auditors
3 the superﬁciality of audits,
3 items that tend to be missed by auditors, particularly in 
relation to freedom of association or discrimination,
3 the numerous ways in which attempts to include the voic-
es of workers in the auditing process, including through 
worker interviews, are being undermined,
3 the absence of training and complaints mechanisms,
3 the lack of skill and experience of auditing staff, and
3 the failure to take into account information from other 
local organisations outside factories.
In covering these areas the chapter also sheds light on the 
problems faced by auditors in carrying out their work. More 
importantly, however, the chapter aims to consider to what 
extent auditing is actually achieving, or failing to achieve, its 
objective of improving workers´ lives. Workers are after all 
meant to be the eventual beneﬁciaries of auditing.
The steps taken by companies when assuming re-
sponsibility for labour standards in the supply chain 
are often quite predictable. Experience shows that 
companies often pass through a series of phases 
when developing policies in relation to respect for 
workers’ rights in their supply chains. Social auditing 
can be used as one tool at a number of points in the 
process:
1 Denial: At this stage, a buyer would deny respon-
sibility for the conditions under which workers in 
the supply chain are working. Fewer and fewer 
buyers adopt this position today, thanks primarily 
to labour rights campaigns that began to occur 
with increasing frequency in the 1990s.
2 Substance: At this point, buyers adopt “codes 
of conduct”, usually following the benchmark of 
the ILO’s core labour standards, as laid down 
in a set of eight conventions, focusing on child 
labour, forced labour, discrimination, freedom of 
association and collective bargaining. To begin 
with, these codes are not much more than com-
mitments on paper.
3 Implementation, monitoring and veriﬁcation: 
The next step is for a buyer to go from paper to 
practice, by implementing the commitments con-
tained in a code of conduct. This has happened 
more and more in recent years, as companies 
were challenged by critics to demonstrate con-
formity to the standards they had adopted.
a Implementation refers to the steps required 
to give practical effect to a code.
b Internal or company monitoring refers to 
the management procedures put in place to 
ensure internally that the implementation  
has indeed taken place in practice among 
suppliers.
c (Independent) veriﬁcation refers to the proc-
ess of establishing the credibility of company 
claims of compliance with a code of conduct. 
Veriﬁcation must be carried out by an entity 
that is entirely independent of, and not in the 
pay of the company itself. In general, multi-
stakeholder initiatives (discussed in chapter 
6) have provided a more credible framework 
for veriﬁcation.
4 Workers’ participation: While much progress 
has been made since the days when companies 
were stuck at the stage of denial, there is still 
much to be done to improve labour conditions 
on the ground. Labour advocates tend to agree 
that without a meaningful role for the intended 
beneﬁciaries of all this—the workers them-
selves—progress is likely to be limited. Many are 
concerned that the rising importance attached to 
social audits is leading to the exclusion of work-
ers from the process.
Social audits may be one tool used to help a compa-
ny monitor its internal progress in monitoring labour 
standards. A company may carry out the audit itself, 
or it may engage a social auditing ﬁrm to do so. A 
supplier may also engage a social auditor to obtain a 
certiﬁcation in order to obtain orders from companies 
that require certiﬁcation according to one scheme or 
another, such as SA8000. 
The main motive driving the use of social audits is 
risk prevention. In other words, factories must be 
cleared of child labour, bonded labour and other 
extreme labour abuses in case reporters or activists 
ﬁnd out and expose the company to consumers. If 
this happens, the company can point to the fact that 
it did an audit and that independent experts had 
given it the all clear.
In all cases, it is the standards preferred by the buyer 
that are likely to be used, since this process is linked 
to the internal management system of the buying 
ﬁrm, even if the supplier pays for the audit.
In the process of veriﬁcation social audits may be 
one tool used by a multi-stakeholder initiative, such 
as the Fair Labor Association (FLA) or the Fair Wear 
Foundation (FWF). In these cases, the parameters
of the audit will tend to be set by the multi-
The standards that auditors are asked 
to apply tend to be very similar, and are 
based on the ILO’s core labour standards, 
health and safety requirements, and, in 
some cases, a “living wage” requirement. 
Many companies have their own codes 
of labour practice, and ask auditors to 
use these.
Audit ﬁrms can be accredited to apply 
the SA8000 standard, developed by 
Social Accountability International, and 
then supplier factories can pay the ﬁrms 
to audit them according to this standard.
Some buyers prefer to audit according 
to codes developed by multi-stakeholder 
initiatives such as the Ethical Trading 
Initiative (more on MSIs in chapter 6).
The devil is in the details, though. While 
standards differ little, the quality and 
credibility of applying, monitoring and 
verifying the standards varies a lot. 
The context for social auditing  
One standard 
today, another 
tomorrow
to be continued on page 21 
 20 21ADVANCE WARNING OF AUDITS MAKE FRAUD AND  DECEPTION EASIER
The purpose of a social audit is to get a good picture of the labour situation in a 
workplace. Clearly, unannounced audits can prevent management from having the 
factory cleaned up in advance or other forms of cheating. And while there are certain 
instances in which it is appropriate for the date of the visit of auditors to be known 
in advance (for example when the accountant needs to be present to provide speciﬁc 
information), the research for this report suggests that the vast majority of audit visits 
are being made with plenty of advance warning for factory managers.5 With so much 
advance warning, there are a wide range of steps that are taken by factory manag-
ers to trick auditors even in the more “tangible” areas, such as the practice of only 
unlocking medical cabinets and ﬁre exits during the visits of the auditors (and then 
locking and closing them afterwards). And naturally, given plenty of warning, there are 
many ways in which the worker interview process can be undermined. Unannounced 
audits at least give auditors a ﬁghting chance to identify problems. 
Every month there are two to three visits by buyers in the factory and the visitors basi-
cally talk with the management. Workers get prior notice for such visit and sometimes 
visitors also talk with 10-15 workers who are selected by the management. These work-
ers are instructed by the management what is to be said to the auditors and if there 
are any workers who are unable to speak according to the instructions then they asked 
not to come till the visit of the auditors ends. Workers at Factory B, Bangladesh, produc-
ing for JC Penny and Wal-Mart 
In Factories B and C in Romania, the auditor of Swedish fashion giant H&M has the 
right to enter the premises at any time within the working day, without any prior noti-
ﬁcation. The H&M auditor, with an interpreter, is allowed to circulate un-accompanied 
inside the factory. Under these unannounced conditions, it is easy to see how an audi-
tor has some chance of spotting problems and getting a sense of the real situation 
faced by workers. Indeed, in Romania, researchers found that in factories where one 
buyer was allowed to make unannounced visits, better labour conditions seemed to 
prevail.
In most cases, however, this is the exception, rather than the rule. Auditors tend to tell 
factory managers in advance that they are coming to carry out an audit. Factory A in 
north India, for instance was last audited in January 2005 by a Social Accountability 
International (SAI) accredited auditing ﬁrm. After an initial audit, follow-up audits every 
six months are compulsory. The audit is announced one week before the due date of 
the audit.6 
In India there are no unannounced audits by third party as yet. Many of our suppliers 
will not be able to meet issues raised in social compliance if unannounced audits take 
place. Announced audits are thus in vogue. It will take time for our suppliers to meet 
high standards of labour conditions. Employee in India for large global social auditing 
ﬁrm
stakeholder initiative itself, rather than the sourcing 
company. In the ﬁeld research carried out for this 
study, workers themselves were often in the dark 
as to whether social audits were part of monitoring 
or veriﬁcation, and whether the audits were ordered 
by their own employers, the buyers, or third parties. 
However, given that veriﬁcation is still used only to 
a limited degree by certain more responsive compa-
nies, it is likely that most audits were in fact linked to 
internal monitoring programmes.
It should also be noted that best practices in the ﬁeld 
of social compliance are subject to much discussion, 
testing and experimentation. The aim of this report 
is not to propose a perfect compliance model, but 
to look at the problems associated with bad social 
auditing.
In Factory A in southern China, producing for DKNY, Just Perfect and Michael Kors, 
preparatory work for the audit was very evident to workers:
The workplace would be cleaned up, the ﬁrst aid box at the workplace which is locked 
up at normal times would be unlocked for auditing, the supervisors would give brief-
ings to workers about how they should answer questions from the auditors in case they 
were picked for interview.
In Factory C in Kenya, producing for Wal-Mart, workers listed the following arrange-
ments made by managers prior to announced audits:
3 Thorough cleaning of the company, 
3 provision of towels, soaps and powder to the employees,
 workers are forced to say that they are always given milk, which is not true,
3 They are told to quote low targets to impress the auditors while the targets are usu-
ally quite high,
3 they are told to say that they don’t work overtime, especially not on Sundays, and
3 generally, workers are drilled on how to present a good image of the company to 
ensure that it receives the order.
Auditors in India said that in the early stages, factories should be given notice in order 
to get them used to the process. The picture on the ground, however, is one of manag-
ers who are already experienced at passing audits. They are increasingly sophisticated 
in learning how to score well with auditors, taking advantage of the lenient approach 
of auditors. Separate departments, dedicated to ensuring compliance during audits, 
clearly become expert at responding to news of a forthcoming visit by auditors. 
In China, in Factory C, producing for Warner Bros, Hatland and the Beijing Olympic 
Committee, it was reported that the supervisors all have a standard coaching manual 
of how to instruct production line workers during the audit. Workers are told to give 
standard answers according to the labour law to the auditors. Workers reported that 
management is careful not to pass on any “evidence” such as the coaching manual to 
workers.
In northern India all factory managers and auditors interviewed conﬁrmed that the vis-
its of auditors are signalled in advance. Researchers said, “According to the manage-
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Social auditors will visit a supplier to check whether 
there is conformity with a labour standard laid out in 
the code of conduct they have been given. The objec-
tives can include:
3 assessing the problems that exist in a factory, 
3 developing a corrective action or remediation 
plan. 
A social audit typically includes three steps, some-
times referred to as the “circle of evidence” (see 
ﬁgure), and takes anything from a few hours to a few 
days. Please note that chapters 2 and 3 will explore 
the reality of such audits in more detail.
A document review is carried out to check wages 
and hours, bonuses, personnel management, the 
application of internal regulations and collective bar-
gaining agreements. Documents reviewed can include 
time cards, content receipts, union declarations, and 
personnel ﬁles. How useful a document review is de-
pends ﬁrst of all on how accurate these documents 
are (see also section on corruption). 
A site inspection—also referred to as a physical in-
spection or factory walk-through—might reveal health 
and safety problems. Inspectors might look at emer-
gency exits, ﬁre extinguishers, bathrooms, alleys or 
passageways, ventilation, cleaning, safety equipment 
and noise levels. A walk-through might also reveal 
information on management-worker relations, for 
instance whether workers seem uncomfortable and 
stop talking when the line supervisor appears. 
Interviews should be a key element of an audit. In-
terviews are usually held with workers, management, 
and in best practice cases, with local unions and/or 
NGOs. It is valuable for auditors to speak directly 
with workers about the conditions they work in. Audi-
tors can use the interviews, which can also happen 
outside factory premises, to check if workers get paid 
the legal minimum wage and the legal overtime rate, 
whether management has prevented union activities, 
etc. 
Who does the audit? 
The vast majority of audits are carried out by interna-
tional commercial audit ﬁrms, such as CSCC, Intertek 
and SGS. These are known as “third party audits”, 
because they differ from “second party audits”, which 
are carried out by a buyer’s own compliance or CSR 
staff, and “ﬁrst party audits” which are basically self-
assessment exercises carried out by a supplier itself. 
In this report, the focus is mainly on third and second 
party audits.
What happens in a social audit?
ment, there is no special planning for it.”7 But evidence provided to the researchers 
from workers showed this is patently untrue. 
The day when our factory is cleaned, many dustbins suddenly kept all over the factory, 
ﬂoor neatly swept, workers being given needle guards. It is a sign that auditors are go-
ing to come. Worker, Factory A, north India, producing for BCL, Saki and RCC 
(Supervisor’s name) is present at the time of the interview so we get to know who 
was interviewed and what was asked. We hold meetings with the workers, train them, 
before the audit. We tell them what may be asked and what should be answered. Man-
ager, Factory A, north India, producing for BCL, Saki and RCC
New or young looking workers would be arranged for paid leave during the audit lest 
they did not behave properly during the audit. Research on Factory C in China, produc-
ing for Warner Bros, Hatland and the Beijing Olympic Committee
 
Among experts, there are different views on whether audits should be announced or 
unannounced. Auditors often prefer announced audits because the factory is than 
capable of preparing the visit, for example by making sure that the right managers are 
available for an interview or that the relevant documentation is accessible.8 The not-
for-proﬁt social audit organisation GMIES, based in El Salvador, argues that announced 
visits “are rich in information because they are top to bottom inspections, while unan-
nounced visits are reserved for follow up on speciﬁc points so that monitors can count 
on the surprise effect”.9 More advanced approaches nowadays use a combination 
depending on where they are in the cycle of auditing and remediation (i.e. the initial 
audit might be announced, but the follow-up visits might be unannounced).
Another reason why visits are often announced is that “retailers and audit ﬁrms do not 
want to jeopardize their relationship with their suppliers who tend to see unannounced 
visits, part of the so called ‘policing approach’, as impolite and inappropriate interfer-
ence in their business”10. It is worth noting that in this context, unannounced initial 
audits would make it harder for factories to earn their certiﬁcation, or to qualify in 
some way to become a supplier. Auditors apparently have an incentive to give advance 
warning therefore, especially when the supplier is paying, since a factory is likely to 
require regular re-audits, for instance under SA8000 under the BSCI scheme. If a fac-
tory simply fails an audit, it is less likely to need the services of that auditor again in 
the future. Of course, ensuring all audits are announced in advance would not solve 
the problem of bad quality audits or the problem of the culture of cheating among 
factory managers. Managers can easily instruct workers to lie to auditors whenever 
they come to the factory or even when they meet them outside. The discussion around 
announced versus unannounced visits, therefore, is mainly useful for its demonstra-
tion of the limitations of what can be checked and what can be hidden during a social 
audit.
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Source: 
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Figure 1 Circle of Evidence
24 25FRAUD ON WAGES, HOURS AND CONTRACTSFraud is a major problem in the ﬁeld of social audits. Elsewhere the practice of docu-
ment-falsiﬁcation has also been well-researched: double bookkeeping, especially of 
payroll documents and time cards have become common practice in a number of 
important garment and sports shoe production countries. It has been noted that par-
ticularly in China, ”counter-compliance” has become a sophisticated art.11 In factory 
B in southern China, overtime records are routinely falsiﬁed to avoid revealing illegal 
labour practices:
Sewing workers reporting working as many as 150-200 overtime hours in the peak 
season and have only 1-2 days off a month. The factory falsiﬁes the number of working 
hours by limiting it to 102 overtime hours a month, the remaining hours are not com-
pensated. Research on Factory B, southern China, producing for 6ixty8ight, No Romeo, 
Marie Melli and Onlingerie 
Furthermore, these workers are made party to the fraud, to add authenticity:
 
The factory keeps two sets of wage records. The falsiﬁed one shows the number of 
working hours, which is never above 102 per month. The workers need to sign their 
names on both wage records. Research on Factory B, southern China, producing for 
6ixty8ight, No Romeo, Marie Melli and Onlingerie
In Factory F producing for Gloria Vanderbilt, Wal-Mart and Erika in Kenya, the amount 
of overtime shown on workers’ timecards is reduced to the meet the national legal 
maximum of 60 hours.
Stage-management around the visits is increasingly common in north India also. 
No doctor ever comes. There is an instance when auditors have come and helpers have 
been asked to act as doctors.  Worker, Factory B, north India, producing for Wal-Mart
We (workers) have to work seven days in a week. We are never paid double the wage 
for overtime since we are paid on piece rate. We always had complaints about low 
wages and working hours but we could not express it. Auditors have interviewed me 
once. Before that the management instructed me that we regularly use needle and 
pulley guards, that we do not have overtime, that we are all paid very well and that all 
the workers are very happy. Worker, Factory D, north India, producing for Wal-Mart, Kel-
lwood and Sears
The failure of auditing is exacerbated further if auditors do not even care about discov-
ering the truth. 
I tell auditors that I cannot tell them the truth in relation to some of their questions. 
They smile and move on to something else. Manager from a large apparel factory in 
China12 
Others have found that auditors have recommended ways for managers to get round 
local laws on overtime hours.13 
MODEL FACTORIES AND HIDDEN SUBCONTRACTORS
Another popular method of tricking auditors is to maintain a “model factory”, into 
which auditors are welcomed, whilst subcontracting out the bulk of the work to other 
factories.. In a group of four commonly-owned factories in China, one has an SA8000 
certiﬁcation and indeed provides relatively good working conditions for workers by all 
accounts—this certainly helps it get contracts from a number of international buyers 
that have faced international pressure to improve working conditions, including Disney 
and M&S. Workers in the other three factories in the same group report however that 
work from this model factory is being subcontracted to their factories, in which work-
ing conditions are considerably worse. They produce goods for buyers including Etam 
(France) and WE International (Netherlands), who is a member of the SAI advisory 
board.
In extremely busy times, they are required to work till two in the morning and even 
overnight without being compensated with a day off. There is no day off for consecutive 
months in the peak season. Only when less orders are placed can workers have one to 
two days off per month. Workers from these two facilities have very strong complaints 
about the long working hours, exhaustion and stress. Research on factory D, China.
A consultant in India advising ﬁrms on passing audits acknowledged that the practice 
of not disclosing subcontractors is very common. At other times, subcontractors need 
only ﬁll out self-assessment checklist forms—it’s clear that such practices are wide 
open to abuse by unscrupulous employers, who can provide a false impression via the 
self-assessment forms. It should be noted, however, that SA8000-accredited auditors 
are required to audit all subcontractors as standard procedure, and that if suppliers 
are found to be hiding subcontractors from auditors, it can cost them their certiﬁcation 
or even an order from a buyer.
CORRUPTION IN SOME CASES 
In China, managers of factories offer bribes to auditors in exchange for a clean bill of 
health. This practice, according to observers, appears to have been limited, in Chinese 
factories, to “quality control staff from local commercial bodies (who) will usually give 
them an all clear for a cash bribe”. In research carried out in 2003, managers from 
three separate factories in China alleged that “staff from Wal-Mart’s purchasing de-
partment both sought and accepted bribes”. Although it is unclear to what extent such 
practices extend beyond China, the problem should be seen as serious, given the high 
volume of orders being placed in China in comparison with other producer countries. 
In Kenya, in Factory E, also producing mainly for Wal-Mart, workers claimed that audi-
tors were not only offered cash bribes, but were “given women from the factory”. It 
should be noted, however, that workers in the factory viewed the current conduct of 
Wal-Mart auditors as quite correct.
26 27SUPERFICIAL VISITS BY AUDITORS Short visits by auditors, not well prepared in advance, short worker interviews (usually 
not more than 15 minutes per worker) tend to prevent identiﬁcation of many problems. 
These inspections are often very superﬁcial and basically undertaken as a risk as-
sessment. Not much time is spend on searching for violations that are more difﬁcult 
to detect, such as discrimination, harassment or limitations of the right to organise. 
Jem Bendell, who critically assessed the SA8000 methodology, argues that a thorough 
investigation of a production site cannot be done in a two-to-three day audit, which 
seems to be the average amount of time spent in most audits. 
To illustrate the size of the task, the SA8000 Guidance Document on how to do a social 
audit, which gives very general information, is 67 pages long (GD98-IV). To do a thor-
ough investigation of all issues with on- and off site interviews, focus groups, surveys, 
documentary analysis, in ways that respond to results as they arise, is an impossible 
task. People who argue that it is possible either don’t know the complexity of the is-
sues, have a very different understanding of the word ‘thorough’, or have a commercial 
interest in saying so. 14
It is worth noting that Bendell chose SA8000 as one of the highest standards avail-
able among code compliance initiatives, and that, as identiﬁed by this report, there is 
a growing tendency for companies to opt for less stringent options, such as the BSCI 
standard, referred to by some as “SA8000-lite”.15
We have to be practical. All these auditing visits cost money and we cannot afford to 
spend more time.  Auditors in Romania
Workers interviewed in China (Factory C) had doubts about how certain day-to-day 
management practices could be inspected during short worker interviews and one-day 
factory audits:
The factory management has a wide range of ﬁnes and penalties to discipline workers. 
These include a ﬁne of RMB20 for not wearing the factory ID card, a ﬁne of RMB50 
for un-authorised leave of one day plus RMB5 for the food subsidy of the day, a ﬁne of 
RMB20 for not turning off the lights in the dormitory room and poor sanitation. If work-
ers apply for sick leave, not only are they not paid, they will lose the full attendance 
bonus of RMB50. Workers have strong complaint about these practices and cast doubts 
about how these day-to-day management practices could be inspected during the short 
worker interview and the one-day factory audit. Research on Factory C, southern China 
producing for Warner Bros, Hatland and the Beijing Olympic Committee
Similar doubts were expressed by workers in Factory E in Kenya, which produces for 
Wal-Mart:
The auditors are always in a hurry; they sometime only use their eyes and never engage 
the workers. They should know that we have a lot of problems, which they can’t know 
just by using their eyes; they must talk to us if they truly want to know our problems….
Sometimes auditors are simply sloppy in their approach, making basic errors, such as 
allowing managers from the factory to translate for them during worker interviews, or 
allowing managers to select the workers for interview:
As all the auditors coming to this factory are foreigners, they need translators. At times, 
they bring their own translator but in some instances they ask a management person to 
translate it for them. Research on Factory D, Pakistan, producing for Springﬁeld, Lindex 
and C&A
Usually, C&A notiﬁes about a future visit and do not come with their own interpreter—
this is why the auditor is always accompanied by a person assigned by the company’s 
management. Manager of Factory B, Romania
Workers … observed that in every month there are two to three visits by the buyers 
in the factory and the visitors basically talk with the management. Workers get prior 
A series of admissions of the failure of social auditing
3 Nike’s 2004 corporate responsibility report 
states that falsiﬁcation of information by Chinese 
factories “related to wages and hours of work is 
common. This extends to the practice of coach-
ing of workers by factory mangers trying to de-
ceive compliance auditors”  
(Nike, 2005). 
3 “In China, Indonesia and Vietnam, most payrolls 
are falsiﬁed, a fact known to auditors who feel 
frustrated because in most cases they can hardly 
ﬁnd out what is truly happening in a facility be-
cause they can not crosscheck with information 
provided by workers since they have usually been 
coached by management”  
(Adam et al. 2005: 9).
3 The Financial Times quotes a compliance execu-
tive as saying: “We’re rewarding factories that are 
falsifying records (…). We are creating a disincen-
tive to really play by the rules and comply” (April 
21, 2005). 
3 Gap also admits that “concealment of overtime 
and unwillingness to share accurate  
documentation” is a major issue in China (cited 
in MSN, July 2004). 
3 Software been developed to deceive social audi-
tors. They generate false payment and timecard 
records, and even include random errors to make 
the records look more authentic making it more 
difﬁcult to discover irregularities on wages and 
excessive overtime (statement made by Neil 
Kearney (ITGLWF) at ETI conference May 2005).
3 The China representative of Det Norske Veritas, 
an audit ﬁrm accredited by SA8000, said that 
enforcing labour standards in China is “impossi-
ble”. “You have in southern China all the factors 
working against you (…) There are the multina-
tionals, which want low labour costs; the factory 
managers, who don’t like us because of ﬁnes 
for non-conformity, and even the local Chinese 
Government in many places, which wants this 
business and does not want it threatened. All 
this is working against the cause of the workers” 
(SabgeHsu Shuaijum cited in South China Morn-
ing Post, December 18, 2000).
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Table 1 
notice for such visits and sometimes visitors also talk with 10-15 workers who are se-
lected by the management. Research on Factory B, Bangladesh, producing for Wal-Mart 
and J.C. Penney
It is no wonder, therefore, that where improvements in working conditions are identi-
ﬁed by workers, they tend to be relatively superﬁcial, such as signposts, presence of 
ﬁre extinguishers and toilets, stocking of medical cabinets and provision of drinking 
water. 
Of course, less superﬁcial social audits are likely to be more expensive, since they 
would require more staff and more hours. See chapter 5 for more discussion on the 
cost of compliance to good labour standards.
ABANDONING THE QUEST FOR THE PERFECT AUDIT?
In a factory in Pakistan, the managers had evolved a sophisticated understanding of 
the different styles of auditing:
Although the guidelines are similar of all the brands regarding social compliance, their 
approach to auditing is quite different. In fact, a lot depends on the auditors. What is a 
major non-compliance issue for one is very minor for another. For instance, Springﬁeld 
thinks that deduction from wages on disciplinary grounds is a major non-compliance 
issue whereas H&M are a lot less stringent on that. During the interview, the manager 
said that generally US ﬁrms are fussier whereas European retailers such as H&M and 
C&A are more accommodating to minor violations…more concerned with major com-
pliance issues such as crossing the overtime limit, harassment in the workplace, gen-
eral working conditions and occupational safety and health issues. Research on Factory 
D, Pakistan, producing for Springﬁeld, Lindex and C&A 
The difference in approach between US and European ﬁrms was also noted by re-
searchers in Bangladesh, and it complements evidence from ﬁeld research in Malawi 
from 2003, which noted the tendency of suppliers in the country to accommodate 
differing demands of buyers:
At least two of the factories are considering building an extra factory for production di-
rected to the US to accommodate the demands of buyers. This would eventually lead to 
a situation where there are two standards of working conditions in the same company 
depending on whether the production is for the US or South Africa. 16
While it is tempting to recommend that auditors go back to the drawing board, and try 
again to come up with the perfect methodology for social audits, the sophistication of 
suppliers trying to cheat their way through audits would no doubt continue to develop 
as it has done already since the widespread growth in the use of social auditing. 
This research would not conclude with any “technical” recommendations on “improving” 
the methodology of social auditing in the context of China. Rather the research would 
like to reiterate the core issue of strengthening the awareness and capacity of workers 
in China to organise themselves as subjects that would participate in bottom up moni-
toring within the legal framework of worker representation at the workplace. General 
comment from researchers in China
The overall picture emerging from the research for this report is that, among buyers 
that seem to be relying primarily on social auditing, progress is only being made in 
three out of nine key areas:  
3 It is contributing partially to reducing the use of child labour, to ensuring forced 
labour is not used, and to improvements in the health and safety situation for 
workers. 
3 It is failing to bring signiﬁcant improvements in freedom of association and right to 
collective bargaining, non-discrimination, wages, working hours, employment rela-
tionship, and abusive treatment of workers.
The Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI)17 notes, however, that even this limited progress is 
mainly conﬁned to the ﬁrst tier of the supply chain, and does not stretch, for the most 
part, as far as the subcontracting factories that play a big role in ﬁlling orders from 
buyers.
How do social audits score in improving workers’ lives?
Freedom of association and right to collective bargaining
Forced labour
Child labour
Non-discrimination
Wages
Working hours
Health and safety
Employment relationship
Abuse
 Auditing having some impact
 Auditing having limited or no impact
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32 33FALLING BELOW THE RADARAuditors are more concerned with physical aspects of audits such as second exits and 
regular ﬁre drills but not about things that affect workers most and that is decent living 
wages. Sohnia Ali, secretary of Mutahida Labour Federation, Pakistan
An audit-only approach is unlikely to be effective in tackling a number of problems 
also intimately linked to the working conditions of workers, particularly in discovering 
violations that are intangible such as anti-union policies or forms of discrimination and 
harassment. This is conﬁrmed by a Pakistani auditor who has done work for the World-
wide Responsible Apparel Production (WRAP) initiative described in chapter 5. Accord-
ing to this auditor, buyers tend to be soft on suppliers: 
As per law, there is a 48 hour work week but it is violated…(while) workers are to be 
paid overtime wages at double rate of their wages… piece rate workers are not paid 
those wages…no worker is allowed to work in a factory without providing one day’s rest 
in seven days, but at times they ask workers to work for 14 days straight…quite a lot of 
factories fail payment of social security…. (violations regarding) workers’ right to form/
join any trade union of their choice Auditor Pakistan 
The apparel company Gap (US) has also acknowledged that some violations, for exam-
ple of freedom of association and discrimination, are difﬁcult to uncover.18 And Nike, a 
company that has been the subject of much campaigning to improve working conditions 
at its supply facilities, knows very well the limits of auditing, stating: 
(E)ffective monitoring whether a worker truly has freedom to association and bargain 
collectively is (…) a challenge because there are many subtle methods employers 
might use to restrict workers’ rights to freely associate. While worker interviews are 
probably the most important tool for assessing compliance around this issue, it can 
only truly be tested during periods when workers are actively exercising this right.19 
Representatives of the GTZ-AVE project in Romania, listed the following improvements 
as typical results of audits:20
3 correct illumination,
3 sufﬁcient and clean toilets,
3 proper ventilation,
3 adequate equipment (depending of what kind of products the clients ordered),
3 canteen provision, and
3 proper and appropriate spaces to deposit raw materials.
It is clear that, in spite of limited impact in many cases, the insistence of buyers on 
compliance, policed by social auditing, is helping to have a limited but positive effect 
on companies, particularly in areas linked to occupational health and safety. 
For instance, in Factory D in north India, producing for Wal-Mart, Kellwood and Sears, 
workers noted visible improvements in the health and safety situation in the factory in 
the last ﬁve years such as ﬁrst aid boxes (albeit containing only expired medicines!) 
and clean drinking water through water coolers.
The biggest changes since audits have been that the management has installed equip-
ment for occupational safety and health on the machines. Protective gears on machine 
wheels were put up. Eye protectors were provided to the workers, which they did not 
have before. They have also installed a fuse system with the switches, whereas previ-
ously it was just a plug-in system. The difference would be that in case of short circuits, 
the machine will be switched off automatically and will not harm the worker working 
on it or be the cause of ﬁre or any other hazard. They have built a new staircase, sepa-
rate restrooms for men and women, 10 new washrooms and extended the dining area 
of the canteen. They have also relocated the ladies washroom to the second ﬂoor and 
closed down the one that was next to the water coolers on the ﬁrst ﬂoor. The manage-
ment have strengthened their human resource department and developed personnel 
ﬁles of all the workers, which they didn’t have before... Research on Factory A,Pakistan, 
producing for J.D. Williams, La Blanche Porte, Venca, KarstadtQuelle, Neckermann, 
Mode & Preis, Zeeman, YDG International and Wal-Mart
While most observers acknowledge that under the right circumstances social audit-
ing can lead to improvements regarding more visible or physical problems there are a 
number of more fundamental areas which pass under many auditors’ radars virtually 
undetected. These might include:
3 the undermining of freedom of association and collective bargaining by managers,
3 excessive and forced overtime,
3 abusive attitudes to workers on the part of supervisors,
3 withholding of wages owed,
3 insufﬁcient provision of medical care and sick leave, and
3 discriminatory hiring practices.
Overtime abuses, bad management attitudes, withholding of wages and insufﬁcient 
provision of medical care and sick leave can, in theory, be checked for qualitatively, 
particularly through workers’ interviews. The level of cheating on the part of factory 
managers during audits suggests that the additional step of interviewing workers 
outside the workplace in relation to these issues should be taken. If workers have a 
stronger voice in audits, it is likely that a more accurate picture would be obtained.
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
Today many codes of conduct in the garment and sportswear industry stipulate 
freedom of association, which is the right of workers to be free to join and form trade 
unions. Research suggests that only 15% of audits take freedom of association into 
account.21  Auditors who spend no more than a couple of hours at most conducting 
worker interviews, often in an atmosphere of distrust, are unlikely to be able to dis-
cern whether workers feel they can enjoy the right to join and form trade unions.
Reality is the management does not want (a union) so we shall never have it. When 
some people tried in the past the whole system of recruitment in the factory changed, 
and we were thrown out as employees and taken in as employees of subcontractors. If 
we ever try now, we will be thrown out completely. Worker, Factory A, north India,  
producing for BCL, Saki and RCC
 34 35I have heard of very bad experiences by other workers who were members of unions and were thrown out of a job because of that. Worker, Factory A, north India, producing for BCL, Saki and RCC
Managers are traditionally biased against union organising, and it is a well-known tactic 
of employers the world over to say that there is no need for a union in a workplace, 
and to encourage workers to take the same view. In spite of this, at the ILO social au-
ditors meeting, participants said, “in most cases, even where attention is paid to free-
dom of association, only the managers are asked whether or not they allow unions”. 
There is no union in the factory, neither is there any workers representative body, al-
though the management claims that there is no restriction imposed on the workers 
from them. The factory manager is of the opinion that the workers are happy with their 
management that’s why they don’t want to make a union. Interview with manager, Fac-
tory C, Pakistan, audited under AVE scheme, and producing for  
KarstadtQuelle, C&A, Disney and Wal-Mart
It is hard to see how an auditor can make a credible assessment of the level of free-
dom of association enjoyed by workers when only a manager’s opinion is sought!
Normally, when outsiders are not around, anti-union attitudes of managers are made 
very clear to workers.
Workers … are not allowed to form any union or organisation. The management has 
warned them that if any one tries to organise workers and form a union he or she 
would be handed over to the police. Workers, Factory B, Bangladesh, producing for JC 
Penney and Wal-Mart
The fear of losing one’s job is likely to make trade unions a taboo subject in an audit 
interview with a worker, as was the experience of researchers who talked to a group of 
workers about union membership in factory F in Romania. Workers from this factory 
acknowledged the need for a union. However, they said, that management would not 
allow it, and made clear that they should not even be discussing such a topic with out-
siders. In none of the seven countries researched did any workers report being asked 
by auditors about freedom of association, although trade unions did operate in some 
of the workplaces studied. 
Often, when asked about freedom of association factory managers will point to the 
existence of some kind of “works council” or “welfare committee” in the workplace, or 
at least a suggestion box. This is apparently because they have learned that these are 
things that auditors will give credit for, since these are considered to be “steps in the 
right direction” towards freedom of association:
A lot of the brands look at the issue of freedom of association as a way to improve 
dialogue and communication between management and employees. They therefore 
check to see whether or not there are suggestion boxes, complaint mechanisms and/or 
worker representatives in the factory. Although they realize that this does not equate 
with having union representation (for example, it does not allow for collective bargain-
ing or free and fair elections), they nevertheless see it as a step in the right direction to 
giving employees a voice and having a more effective workplace.22
The relation between trade unions and other kinds of worker representation needs to 
be looked at carefully. Guidance developed by multi-stakeholder initiatives speciﬁcally 
warns auditors to pay attention to this.
Fundamental to the function of worker representatives is that the employer can-
not designate or control them. There must be a legal framework independent of the 
employer in which representatives, for example those in works councils, are selected. 
When they are elected outside of a trade union structure, the employer must not 
control the election. Works councils and labor-management councils can be consist-
ent with freedom of association if workers are also free to join trade unions and to 
engage in collective bargaining. 
Even when freedom of association is included in the audit process, auditors generally 
have great difﬁculty in correctly assessing the meaning of various forms and types of 
worker representation mechanisms such as welfare committees or works councils. 
They often consider the existence of such a committee as evidence of compliance on 
freedom of association, while this is by no means always the case—it depends very 
much on the legal as well as the practical conditions under which such mechanisms 
operate. 
For instance, in some countries, where freedom of association is restricted by law, 
these committees are seen as so-called “parallel means of representation”. Code 
initiatives call on companies to establish parallel means of independent and free asso-
ciation and bargaining for all workers to encouraging nascent forms of worker-represen-
tation only in countries or areas where independent unions are prohibited. If applied 
correctly it can provide a certain space for worker representation. 
Examples of these structures include the establishment of workers’ councils, welfare 
committees, complaints resolution committees, and basic-needs wage committees. 
Approaches to parallel means are heavily criticized by some, particularly when the 
concept is misused to undermine the position of trade unions or misinterpreted to 
justify the employer dominated election of “worker representatives”, or its presence in 
countries that otherwise violate human rights (which includes the right to organize). 
The existence of a union in the factory also does not automatically imply that workers 
are able to exercise their right to freedom of association. In China, where the forma-
tion of independent trade unions is prohibited by law, the existence of a trade union is 
unlikely to signal any freedom of association:
A plant level trade union is formed but it is largely composed of management. The in-
terviewed workers do not know how the trade union was formed nor do they think the 
union is representing their interests due to over-representation of management in the 
union. Research, Factory B, south China, producing for 6ixty 8ight, No Romeo, Marie 
Melli, and Onlingerie
 36 37In countries where freedom of association is not restricted by law, non-union structures can be misused as a way to sub-stitute for unions, or as a management technique to prevent 
more active and effective unions from operating. Local unions 
in Tirupur commented on the recent tendency of ﬁrms to set 
up welfare committees:
Most of the companies do not promote trade union activi-
ties but in the place of trade unions, welfare committees 
are formed in the factories. The trade unions said that these 
welfare committee formations have hampered and sabotaged 
their growth and activities. 
In Tirupur researchers found that a consultant, providing facto-
ries with tips on how to gain SA8000 accreditation, speciﬁcally 
advised clients to set up welfare committees as an alternative 
to unions. In Bangladesh, a researcher noted a similar trend 
when talking to various players involved in the auditing industry:
Retailers do not have strong obligation towards workers’ union 
although they encourage workers’ welfare associations among 
the workers. 
However, in other cases such structures can provide genuine 
means for worker-management communication or consultation 
or even negotiation and in some cases are even obligatory 
under law. It is quite possible for them to co-exist with trade 
unions. 
The key question is how they are used in practice, just as 
trade unions can in reality be management-controlled (com-
monly referred to as “yellow unions”), and not in any way 
acting in the interest of workers. With such considerations in 
mind, the mention by managers of “works councils”, compris-
ing worker and management representatives, mentioned by 
a number of managers in northern India seemed suspicious, 
given that workers interviewed were unaware of their function 
or even their existence. 
In countries where workers are allowed by law to join and form 
their own trade unions, as is the case in India and Pakistan, 
auditors should be careful about treating any clearly undemo-
cratic mechanism as “a step in the right direction”. Many fear 
that this is becoming a common practice among auditors.
The factory does not have a union but they have a workers’ representative ‘Labour 
Working Committee’, which is a non-elected body. Research on Factory A, Pakistan, pro-
ducing for J.D. Williams, La Blanche Porte, Venca, KarstadtQuelle, Neckermann, Mode & 
Preis, Zeeman, YDG International and Wal-Mart
Checking for the presence of freedom of association is a qualitative assessment to 
make for an auditor and is easily subject to manipulation. It requires good knowledge 
of labour law and practice and a working relationship with trade union bodies and 
other labour-related organisations. Organisation such as the Workers’ Rights Consor-
tium (WRC), for example, have developed sensitive methods to assess key indicators, 
such as whether representatives are freely elected, when investigating complaints, 
and rely on good local knowledge of and long experience with labour relations. 
Some codes of conduct also stipulate a positive attitude to collective bargaining 
alongside freedom of association. Since collective bargaining is the central tool work-
ers can use to collectively discuss and negotiate improvements in wages and working 
conditions with employers, auditors are clearly failing if they are not able to detect 
management’s attitude to this tool. The following demonstrates management’s nega-
tive attitude toward collective bargaining:
(There is no collective bargaining agreement) because we are paying the minimum 
wage. Minimum wage of the workers is also certiﬁed by the auditors. Manager, Factory 
A, north India, producing for BCL, Saki and RCL
In factory E in north India, where no trade union was present and no collective bargain-
ing agreement was in force, workers felt that management would not approve of a 
trade union. Seven of the workers interviewed said that they would like to form a trade 
union in order to put their demands and perspective forward. 
In absence of a trade union it is very difﬁcult to talk about a wage hike. Many times we 
mustered courage and tried to put our demands forward but we always reverted back 
due to the fear of reaction from the management. Worker, Factory E, north India, pro-
ducing for IKEA, Carrefour, Colby and Wal-Mart
Auditors at an ILO technical meeting held in Ankara at 18 May 2005 acknowledged 
that no consistent benchmarks exist for auditors on freedom of association and col-
lective bargaining, and they argued that audits should be complemented by training 
for managers and workers to help explain the potential beneﬁts of respect for these 
rights. One of the clear beneﬁts is that the ability to exercise freedom of association 
and collective bargaining helps establish effective worker-management communica-
tion, which is key to a good working environment.
These are referred to as “enabling 
rights” because their full implementation 
provides mechanisms through which 
workers can ensure that other labour 
standards are upheld in workplaces. 
That is to say, in workplaces with a 
functioning trade union, collective 
bargaining machinery, and effective 
dispute and complaints mechanism, 
workers are able to monitor workplace 
conditions and protect their own rights. 
It is here that many argue that codes 
of conduct can play an important role. 
By creating a space where industrial 
relations structures can take shape, they 
can be most effective in ensuring the 
implementation of all code standards. 
Freedom of 
association and the 
right to collective 
bargaining
38 39INSUFFICIENT PROVISION OF MEDICAL CARE AND SICK LEAVE Provision of medical care and sick leave, two things auditors can check for, often exist 
on paper only. For example, under Indian law workers have a right to free health care 
but in practice this comes at a hefty price. 
All the workers have ESIC cards. This means that they can go to ESIC hospitals for their 
treatment free of cost. The workers however expressed practical problems in using this 
facility. According to them, for a check up in an ESIC hospital it usually takes at least 
three to four hours. But the factory allows them maximum an hour to see the doctor. So 
in that time workers can only visit a private clinic for which they have to pay. Going to 
an ESI hospital would mean losing wage for half a day. Workers from Factory C, north 
India, producing for KarstadtQuelle, Kingel, Derma Group, Otto, Spiegel and Littlewoods, 
audited under the BSCI scheme
DISCRIMINATORY HIRING PRACTICES AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Discrimination is one of the most difﬁcult labour abuses for auditors to identify, and 
it has a strong gender dimension. Take, for example, Factory E in north India, produc-
ing for IKEA, Carrefour, Colby and Wal-Mart, where the management stated that “there 
is a provision for maternity leave but presently there is no scope for its implementa-
tion among the workers since all the women labourers in the factory are above the 
age of 45 or are unmarried.” Since the situation described by the manager persists, 
one must assume that the auditor did not pick this up as an indication as possible 
discrimination in hiring—an innocent enough sounding statement can easily hide 
a hiring policy that rejects any candidates who seem likely to become pregnant. By 
avoiding hiring such people, a discriminatory practice, management can still appear to 
be following the rules by providing for maternity leave on paper. As one Indian Labour 
Department ofﬁcer put it: 
Companies do not prefer married women, because there is a possibility that they will 
take maternity leave and sick leave.
Harassment is a much harder practice to detect, and it is difﬁcult to see how most 
auditors, given their methods, can uncover instances of it in a short audit visit. The 
CCC believes that participatory auditing, described in more detail later in this report, 
address these issues more effectively. Contacts with credible local organisations can 
help greatly. 
Cases of sexual harassment … seldom come out of interviews or single audits. Also 
formal complaints are not made. People are afraid or ashamed to talk about it. Single 
cases are best dealt with in a discrete and conﬁdential way, to avoid negative conse-
quences for the victim. Digging into details may be very embarrassing. Especially young 
migrant women workers are very vulnerable. Discuss with local organisations how to 
gather information about possible sexual harassment at the workplace. Fair Wear Foun-
dation Audit Manual, May 2005
ABUSES RELATED TO WAGES AND OVERTIME
According to the information gathered for this report, falsiﬁcation of factory paperwork 
to hide overtime that exceeds legal limits is widespread. When this is combined with 
the coaching of workers for interviews, another trail of evidence is easily covered up. 
The related violation of forced overtime, is even more difﬁcult for auditors to pin down. 
Workers often cannot refuse overtime, since they know it would endanger their jobs:
Workers say that they are not directly threatened or dismissed but when they refuse to 
do extra hours they are put on the so-called black list. The consequences of being on 
this list are the following: the workers start to be given only very low paid jobs, in case 
of restructuring they are the ﬁrst on the list, the general attitude of the supervisors/
management is very cold and they are very often criticised. According to Romanian re-
searchers, in factory A (producing for ECCE, We, Oliver Grant, Rosner, John Adam, Baker 
Street, Kenzo, Givenchy, HOAL, La Redoute and Pellestrom)
In factory F in Romania, producing for Lotto, Diadora, Adam Business, Zara, We, John 
Adam, C&A, KarstadtQuelle, Neckermann, Otto, Etam, Coulange, Dolce and Gabbana, 
Morobe and Armate de Mare, workers reported that supervisors verbally abuse them to 
push them to meet their targets. Since the targets cannot realistically be achieved in 
normal working hours, workers need to work overtime just to earn the minimum wage.
By delaying payment of wages, employers are also able to prevent workers leaving 
to ﬁnd better employment elsewhere. Although such practices are not widespread, it 
remains a practice that places workers in an impossible situation.
“Yes, I can leave my job with one month prior notice, but my 2 months wage and 3 
months overtime is due. I am sure, I will not get these if I resign. So how can I leave?” 
Operator, Factory F, Bangladesh, producing for Kohl B
Frequently, delayed payment of wages is even used as a subtle means of punishment 
for workers who refuse overtime, as is the case in factory F in Bangladesh. Since this 
does not show up in the records, auditors usually overlook this.
Very frequently, workers are paid poverty wages—wages so low that often even basic 
needs cannot be met. 
Everyone gets paid either minimum wage or more than that, but even that wage is not 
sufﬁcient to make ends meet. It is time that buyers determine a living wage and they 
should ask the producers to pay a living wage instead of minimum wage. They should 
also shoulder part of the costs of the living wages. Sohnia Ali, secretary of Mutahida 
Labour Federation, Pakistan 
Auditors commonly use the minimum wage as the standard to audit against, even 
though it is commonly accepted that in many apparel-producing countries the mini-
mum wage is set at a level that is too low to allow workers to meet basic needs. 
Worse still, once minimum wages have been ﬁxed, according to the ILO, they are not 
adjusted regularly to take factors such as inﬂation into account.23
 40 41Even the “prevailing wage”, understood as the going rate for workers in speciﬁc occupations for a particular area or country, and used by some code initiatives as the “next best 
thing”, often fails to bring workers’ wages above the poverty 
line. A paper prepared by MIT, argues that “in most of the 
major apparel exporting countries, prevailing wages are no 
guarantee that workers can cover living expenses”.24 
Expecting workers to live off of a wage that simply cannot be 
lived off of is unrealistic and seems to contradict any claims 
of “corporate social responsibility” made by buyers. The chal-
lenge of earning a living wage is illustrated in the case of a 
young woman working in Factory C in Pakistan, producing for 
KarstadtQuelle, C&A, Disney and Wal-Mart: 
Because of the fact that wages are so low and the cost of 
living so high, she ﬁnds it very hard to make ends meet. At 
18, she is the only earning member of her family of three. She 
is an only child and both her parents are jobless. She spends 
almost 40% of her income on the rent of her one bedroom 
house. She recently took a loan from her factory to buy a re-
frigerator, which reduced her earnings considerably as her sal-
ary gets deducted to pay back the loan. When asked she said 
she has no idea what social auditing is. When explained she 
said that it is good that the working conditions and health and 
safety measures are checked through the auditing process but 
they should also see that we get better wages. When told that 
it is checked that workers should get at least the minimum 
wage set by the government, which they all do, she said that 
if they think this wage is enough they should all try to live on 
this amount for a month and decide if it is ok.
In spite of the evidence, only a few codes call for the payment 
of a “living wage” and most continue to claim that it is impos-
sible to come up with a measurable standard.
There should be an audit or monitoring on the workers’ wel-
fare, such as whether the wages received by the workers are 
sufﬁcient to fulﬁl the workers’ basic daily needs such as the 
workers do not need to do overtime since the wages have 
already covered what they need to pay for food, housing, and 
putting their children to school” Textile, Clothes and Leather 
Factory Trade Union (SPTSK SPSI), Indonesia, producing for 
Fila.
DO WORKERS HAVE A REAL SAY?
A key element of successful auditing is the interviewing of workers— it is a logical way 
of cross-checking the claims made by employers about labour conditions. 
The table on the next page shows how, when researched carefully, rather shocking 
discrepancies regarding working conditions can quite clearly be found. Worker inter-
views, as they tend to be executed at present, are likely to miss much of this level of 
detail, because in practice they are done quite superﬁcially. Furthermore, managers, 
understandably keen to produce a favourable audit result, often tend to manipulate 
the interview process in a number of ways. 
THE REALITY OF WORKER INTERVIEWS
To address weaknesses identiﬁed by critics early on, most social audit methodolo-
gies now use qualitative as well as quantitative methods (see box on the “circle of 
evidence” chapter 1), relying on worker interviews as well as walking through work-
places and checking the books. Workers’ interviews are generally seen as an impor-
tant component of a social audit and therefore they need to be done carefully in an 
atmosphere that makes a worker feel they can be frank, and have trust in the auditor. 
In practice, interview methods still leave much to be desired. The credibility of worker 
interviews is being systematically undermined by employers. Although many social 
auditors now claim to be able to tell whether workers have been instructed how to 
answer questions, there is no reason to believe that this is true or that auditors have 
gotten any better at collecting information through interviews: 
3 auditors at the ILO technical meeting said, for instance, that they only tend to ask 
managers, and not workers, about freedom of association,
3 in none of the seven countries researched did any workers report being asked by 
auditors about freedom of association
3 the information gathered from around the world for this report repeatedly identi-
ﬁed that during interviews which are always short, the questions asked of workers 
were relatively superﬁcial, and were related nearly exclusively to wages and hours 
worked,
3 auditors often did not explain who they were, nor what their purpose was, nor that 
they did not “represent” buyers, and
3 workers are treated as a source of information rather than as the major intended 
beneﬁciaries of the process
Researchers in northern India observed:
No worker who had met the social auditor could be identiﬁed. According to the informa-
tion collected…supervisors were interviewed by the social auditors. Factory A, produc-
ing for BCL, Saki and RCC 
Even in cases where workers are interviewed, the chances of auditors enjoying an 
honest exchange about working conditions are limited. In many cases, such as at 
Only a few codes (including the CCC 
code) call for the payment of a “living 
wage”. Many claim it is impossible to 
come up with a measurable standard 
for the living wage, or that wage levels 
should be determined through collective 
bargaining between trade unions and 
management. In fact, there are a variety 
of techniques actually available to make 
at least a reasonable estimate of the 
range in which a living wage would fall, 
for example by using the “poverty line”, 
the “purchasing power index”, the so-
called “market basket” approach, or a 
combination of these methods. Other 
benchmarks could include “best practice” 
negotiated wage levels elsewhere in the 
sector, or the wage levels called for by 
unions or labour-related groups active 
in the area. The point about collective 
bargaining is certainly valid, but when no 
union is present in the workplace (which 
is the case in most garment industry 
workplaces), buyers should ensure that 
wage levels allow workers to live. This 
can of course be adjusted later when a 
collective bargaining process goes into 
effect.
Can you really 
measure the living 
wage?
 42 43 When asked if they felt secure when they were interviewed by the auditors in the fac-tory, they said that they didn’t know who was talking to them; neither did they know anything about the compliance issue for which they were being interviewed. Research 
from factory B, Pakistan, producing for KarstadtQuelle
The auditors never told the workers… their identity…. Nor did the auditors inform the 
interviewed workers about how the information they conveyed would be protected and 
factories in northern India, “the interview of the worker is conducted at the shop ﬂoor 
in the presence of everybody including the management”. 
Throughout the interview of the workers conducted by the social auditor, management 
kept a strict vigil. I was not comfortable at all while conversing with the auditors. I was 
so scared by the management’s presence that under pressure I even gave wrong an-
swers. Worker, Factory B, north India, producing for Wal-Mart
The same tends to happen elsewhere:
The employees (between eight and 10 employees in every case, the factory’s manager 
said) are interviewed inside the factory, with the company manager present” Research 
on Factory A, Romania, producing for ECCE, We, Oliver Grant, Rosner, John Adam, Baker 
Street, Kenzo, Givenchy, HOAL, La Redoute and Pellestrom
The level of sophistication of factory managers in undermining worker interviews dur-
ing audits in China is impressive:
Although they couldn’t tell which buyer did which audit, workers felt that there was 
difference in terms of auditing quality. The management would coach them more before 
some buyers’ audits and award workers with RMB100 for giving the “right” answers to 
the auditors. For other buyers and auditors that are less stringent, the factory would 
have relatively relaxed coaching and there is no reward for “good behaviour” either. 
Research on Factory C, southern China, producing for Warner Bros, Hatland and the 
Beijing Olympic Committee
The interviewed workers say they can all memorize the standard answers and would 
not tell the truth to the auditors. Research on Factory B, south China, producing for 
6ixty8ight, No Romeo, Marie Melli and Onlingerie
Auditors are clearly also to blame at times for not encouraging a conﬁdential ex-
change. In almost all factories, workers reported that people came to ask them ques-
tions, but they hardly ever knew on whose behalf these auditors had come, what type 
of audit was being carried out, or what the objective of the exercise was. 
Romanian workers in factory F remembered being asked questions by people they as-
sumed were buyers, but were likely to have been auditors or monitors of some kind. If 
auditors do not explain why they are there, it is hard to see how they can establish the 
necessary rapport to have a frank exchange with a worker. This is particularly troubling 
considering buyers use these worker interviews as the main tool for getting worker 
input on workplace conditions. 
Most (workers) didn’t realise that they were being interviewed by an auditor and what 
kind of impact an audit can make. Research from Factory A, Pakistan, producing for J.D. 
Williams, La Blanche Porte, Venca, KarstadtQuelle, Neckermann, Mode & Preis, Zee-
man, YDG International and Wal-Mart
In Factories A & B, north India, producing for BCL, Saki, RCC and Wal-Mart…
…managers said… …workers said…
3 We have ﬁrst aid boxes in all departments. 
For regular check-up of the workers we have a 
contract with a local hospital. Two trained per-
sons are always present in the factory for ﬁrst 
aid and for cases of emergency. Employer pays 
only for the ﬁrst aid and regular check-up.
3 Medical facilities in this factory are limited to 
a ﬁrst aid box that has an old and inadequate 
collection of medicines. No nurse or doctor ever 
visits the factory. Workers do not have access to 
medical facilities in any other form. They are not 
allowed to take rest when they are ill. If they do 
it their salary is deducted. Only staff from some 
departments, like the salaries department (i.e.. 
higher skilled permanent workers) are entitled to 
visit a private hospital nearby—they have a deal 
with the factory. But when workers go, they have 
to pay for themselves.
3 Workers are given training on how to escape a 
ﬁre. Maps have been ﬁxed for the ﬁre exits indi-
cating the gate from which they should escape.
3 All workers conﬁrmed that there had never been 
any ﬁre drills. There is one emergency exit in the 
factory which is locked.
3 Workers get all the holidays as per government 
rules, i.e. more than 20 in a year
3 According to the workers they get an off only on 
Sundays. Beyond that workers are not allowed 
off for any government holiday.
3 Workers are provided with clean drinking water 3 There is one tap for 350 workers, on the other 
hand managers get mineral water.
3 Water is very dirty. The tank is never cleaned. 
(Workers reported instances where frogs were 
jumping in the tank during rainy season. Also 
one worker reported that a dead rat was found 
in the tank.)
3 The water is very hot. There is a fridge but it 
does not work hence we have to drink water 
from tank.
Table 2
44 45how the workers could complain in case of retaliation or reporting of code violation. Workers at an SA8000-accredited factory, China, producing for DKNY, Just Perfect and Michael Kors 
Although auditors, when talking about their work, tend to refer to efforts they make to 
establish a friendly rapport with the workers interviewed, it obviously does not always 
succeed. Under conditions of distrust, it is not surprising that workers would feel un-
comfortable reporting social audit fraud to auditors.
Workers are “informed” by the supervisors during the coaching that the minimum wage 
in Dongguan city is RMB450…. The management requires all workers to tell the audi-
tors that they would have at least RMB600 a month…. The management had two sets 
of wage records—one to be delivered to workers and the other is a fraud to show to the 
auditors. The fraudulent wage records show that workers in general receive RMB800-
900 a month whereas in reality, the skilled workers are receiving more than RMB1000 
and the less skilled ones get only RMB600-700 a month in the peak season. While 
almost all workers know that the management is using fraudulent wage records for au-
diting, none of the interviewed workers have reported or heard anybody reporting that 
to the auditors. Research on Factory A, southern China, producing for DKNY, Just Perfect 
and Michael Kors
Even the best efforts to keep audits unrehearsed are likely to be ﬂawed. For instance, 
even when workers are selected randomly by auditors, it is hard, if the interviews take 
place in the workplace, to hide the identity of those being interviewed:
According to the management it does not have any prior knowledge of the workers to be 
interviewed by the social auditors. However when the auditing is taking place auditors 
ask the management to send the speciﬁed workers to the conference room. It is only 
during the process of social auditing that management comes to know of the names 
of workers being interviewed by the social auditors. Research on Factory C, north India, 
producing for KarstadtQuelle, Kingel, Derma Group, Otto, Spiegel and Littlewoods
It is generally agreed that interviews are more likely to be open if they take place in 
conﬁdence outside the workplace, particularly if the interviewer takes certain steps to 
build trust with workers beforehand. 
Conduct interviews in a location that makes the worker feel comfortable and which 
does not raise the possibility that the employer will subject the worker to retaliation. 
Always conduct the interview outside the presence of factory managers. This does not, 
and is not intended to, preclude asking routine questions of workers at the factory ﬂoor 
however. A range of locations can be used. Common sense should be used to determine 
speciﬁc sites that afford the greatest opportunity for productive, conﬁdential discus-
sions. Onsite interviews may include informal conversations in the production area of 
the factory ﬂoor, the cafeteria/dining area at meal and rest breaks, the area just out-
side the factory as shifts end, other common areas and locations on site that allow for 
workers to be interviewed without observation by factory management. Interviews con-
ducted off site should be conducted in such a way that factory managers do not gain 
information about which workers have been interviewed. The monitor should use discre-
tion in selecting the location where such interviews take place. Consult local organisa-
tions which are trusted by workers to determine where interviews can take place. Fair 
Wear Foundation Audit Manual, Version May 2005 
The reality is sadly often far from this good practice. Workers in north India told re-
searchers that “usually auditors interview only the supervisors. If there are workers, 
they are those who are senior and close to the management.” In cases where the 
selection for interviews is clearly “stage-managed”, workers in India even recall “times 
when workers have tried to walk up to the auditors and talk to them but they have 
been stopped”. 
One of the workers complained to the social auditor about the low wages given by the 
export house. After they left he was rebuked by the management and was made to feel 
guilty as the buyer cancelled few orders of this export house. He is thus afraid of reper-
cussions if the management comes to know that workers revealed working practices 
to social auditors. They are not supposed to reveal anything apart from what is told to 
them by the management. Worker, Factory E, north India, producing for IKEA, Carrefour, 
Colby and Wal-Mart
Managers often tell workers that the next order from a client depends on them mis-
leading auditors during interviews. 
Like many other workers I ﬁnd it very difﬁcult to participate in the audits. You always 
have to lie for the sake of helping the company get the orders otherwise if we were to 
tell the truth we would never have any orders and that would mean the end of our jobs. 
We would rather lie and receive the orders than to tell the truth and lose our jobs…. 
Worker, Factory B, Kenya, producing for Wal-Mart
Putting such pressure on workers is not only unethical and unfair, but undermines an 
audit—the process that is supposed to be designed to lead to improved conditions 
for workers. Social auditing’s main aim should not be to check on whether an order 
should be placed or cancelled. In any case, auditors doing their job properly should 
make it clear to workers they interview that their job and the future of the factory does 
not depend on the answers they provide. By telling auditors the “wrong” thing however 
workers and their colleagues feel the repercussions from management.
There are cases where if the management realises that someone from a certain depart-
ment told the auditors the truth the whole department is given a very high target. If 
they identify the person who spoke the truth they victimize them on other pretexts…. 
Worker, Factory C, Kenya, producing for Wal-Mart 
The women workers were afraid and don’t want to be interviewed for the auditing be-
cause they fear loss of job. Research on Factory D, Pakistan, producing for Springﬁeld, 
Lindex and C&A
Even those involved in research for this report noted the fear instilled in workers when 
they speak with outsiders. Researchers in Bangladesh noted workers out of work 
following the collapse of Spectrum Sweater were more forthcoming about bad work-
46 47ing conditions at the former workplace then were workers interviewed who were still employed elsewhere (though it was unlikely that conditions at these other workplaces were much better than at Spectrum). 
Workers’ identities in relation to the information they disclose to auditors should be 
kept conﬁdential from management. The Kenyan Human Rights Commission, carrying 
out the research in Kenya, noted that employer efforts to inﬂuence the interview proc-
ess have the result of putting even greater pressure on workers:
The management is usually concerned about the workers chosen by the auditors for 
interviews. Their efforts to have their preferred candidates interviewed are sometimes 
frustrated by auditors who pick workers at random for the interviews. This notwith-
standing workers are always afraid of the interviews due to the expectations of the 
management. Factory C, Kenya, producing for Wal-Mart
Workers who tell the auditors about the failures in the company are always targeted 
for expulsion. Workers say that the management is quite concerned about workers who 
spoil the name of the company during the audit and will do all that is possible to get rid 
of such persons. This has made most workers afraid of the interviews. Factory E, Kenya, 
producing for Wal-Mart.
In an audit carried out as part of the AVE-BSCI programme in Romania, when a man-
ager learned of a remark made by an employee in an interview, he said:
Who said this? I will ﬁre him!
Auditors seem, in some cases, to be sensitive to the possibility of recriminations. 
In Factory C in Kenya, producing for Wal-Mart, it was reported that auditors make 
follow-up visits with the express purpose of ensuring that those interviewed are not 
victimised as a result of what they have reported to auditors. The researcher in Kenya 
believes this improved behaviour is a result of earlier public campaigning exposing 
labour abuses in Kenya in factories where auditors were operating. Unfortunately, this 
practice is currently not widely followed by social auditors, nor replicated by Wal-Mart 
in other countries.
Research by Fondation des droits de L’Homme au travail that critically assessed 
19 audit teams from the private sector, NGOs and brands’ internal auditors in 14 
countries found that some workers are penalized when they do not reach the pro-
duction target when they pause just 10-20 minutes from their work in order to be 
interviewed.25 The research also found that non-proﬁt labour inspection organisations 
tend to conduct more interviews off-site, while commercial auditors tend to interview 
only on-site. An auditor for the non-proﬁt organisation COVERCO in Guatemala argues 
that it takes six or seven conversations before they can ask a worker deeply personal 
questions.26
TAKING INTO ACCOUNT VIEWS OF OTHER LOCAL PLAYERS 
In addition to failing to gather sufﬁcient information fromm workers, researchers found 
that most social auditors also did not gather input from relevant local organizations 
with knowledge of workplace conditions.
There is hardly any contact between audit ﬁrms or buyers and civil society groups in 
Bangladesh. There are a number of NGOs and trade unions involved in the movement 
to ensure the rights of garment workers. Practically it is almost impossible for the civil 
society groups to get in touch with the audit ﬁrms or buyers. General comment from the 
researchers in Bangladesh
Observers are increasingly concluding that social auditing is not effective if some form 
of engagement with credible local organisations does not accompany it. 
Our work has shown that code implementation is most successful when it is backed up 
by local trade unions and other local organisations. ETI Annual Report 2002/2003
There should be a move away from the current top to bottom pattern, led by internation-
al buyers and commercial veriﬁcation bodies, to a bottom to top pattern of monitoring, 
with the involvement of local interest groups and workers. Institute of Contemporary 
Observation, China, 2003 
It should be noted that in the few cases researched for this report where trade unions 
were operating in the workplaces, researchers noted that auditors can and do tend to 
informally cross-check the information they have gathered with local trade unions, as 
is the case with those auditing Factory D in Kenya, producing for GV and Wal-Mart. 
Overall, though, researchers found very few examples of local stakeholders, such as 
trade unions or credible local labour-related NGOs, being involved or even minimally 
consulted in social audits.There is clearly a connection between the extent to which 
most auditors fail to detect labour rights abuses in workplaces using the traditional 
“circle of evidence” (factory documentation—physical observation—management and 
worker interviews), and their failure to gather information from these other relevant 
local sources.
Generally, guidelines for code implementation, such as those for SA8000-accredited 
auditors, advise that auditors seek guidance in their work from local stakeholders. 
Final audit reports, however, are the property of the client, and local organisations will 
not see it. Given that they will not be allowed to see the report, there is little incentive 
for local organisations to work with auditors. In fact, many local labour rights groups, 
particularly in Asia, complain that they are just being used or co-opted by commercial 
social auditors, and treat the latter with extreme caution. An additional concern is that 
commercial auditors tend to apply a different set of standards for different clients. 
Such a lack of consistency can imply a certain lack of ethics in the eyes of local or-
ganisations.
48 49Some companies have noted the value of gathering information from relevant local sources. Apparel company Gap, for example, has recognised their “ability to discover violations (of Freedom of Association) increases when we conduct in-depth interviews 
with workers and engage unions and other organizations that are reliable sources in a 
factory”.27 
WORKERS NOT BEING INFORMED ABOUT THEIR LABOUR RIGHTS
Despite the growing number of companies implementing codes and the number of 
audits conducted each year, very few workers are aware that codes exist, even in work-
places where employers are making signiﬁcant efforts to put them into practice. ETI 
Annual Report 2002/2003
While codes of conduct may indeed stipulate that codes be displayed on the walls of 
the factory in order to ensure workers are aware of their rights, this doesn’t seem to 
be having much of an effect. 
The researcher who visited the factory and the sub-contracted units did not see any 
codes of conduct displayed in the sections visited. In the… human resource depart-
ment, checking and ﬁnishing and cutting department… (and) the sub-contracted units 
the researcher did not notice any codes of conduct displayed… eighteen out of twenty-
one workers interviewed were not aware of codes of conduct pasted in the factory. Only 
three out of twenty one noticed codes of conduct displayed in the factory. Even these 
three… had not read them. Research on Factory A, north India, producing for BCL, Saki 
and RCC
In SA8000-accredited factory A in Pakistan, producing for J.D. Williams, La Blanche 
Porte, Venca, KarstadtQuelle, Neckermann, Mode & Preis, Zeeman, YDG International 
and Wal-Mart, the SA8000 code was not displayed because no Urdu translation was 
available!
In the same factory, workers claimed that any awareness of their labour rights came 
as a result of the memory of a trade union in the factory, ousted by the managers in 
2000. 
All the twenty-one workers interviewed in the factory and sub-contracted units were 
aware of their labour rights and knew how to ﬁle complaints… since (the president of a 
local trade union) had tried to organise the workers in this factory.
Also in Romania, representatives of the GTZ AVE project noted that workers only tend 
to know about the labour standards that brands and retailers ask for in their codes 
when trade unions are active in the factories.
The coaching which the workers in the Indian factory received to ensure that they 
answer the interview questions of social auditors “correctly” has been having a educa-
tional effect, presumably contrary to the intentions of the managers: 
Orientation given by the management to the workers for social auditing process are 
important, though limited instances of their education on labour rights. Research on 
north India, Factory A
By learning from managers the “correct” answers to questions from auditors, workers 
can identify their entitlements for themselves, as well as how management is both 
failing its employees and ﬂouting the standards demanded by buyers. 
Beneﬁting ironically from the propaganda the factory has launched in the SA8000  
process and the management coaching on labour law before the factory audit, workers 
in general are aware of the basic legal requirement on the number of working hours, 
the minimum wage and the overtime compensation rate in China. The question is 
whether the workers would talk about or take action about the gap between the labour 
law and the actual working conditions. Research on Factory A, southern China
Similarly, a worker in the dyeing and bleaching unit of a south India factory may learn 
about the necessity of wearing protective clothing when his managers need to put on 
a show for visitors:
In the dyeing and bleaching unit they are supposed to use gloves, masks, goggles, etc. 
On enquiry he said he uses them sometimes and sometimes he forgets to use them. 
He said “most of us do not care much about using these security measures such as the 
gloves, masks and goggles. The supervisors and the management do not insist on us 
to use them regularly except on certain days when we have some outsider visiting the 
unit— most of them are foreigners and government ofﬁcers”.
COMPLAINT MECHANISMS AS A MEANS OF REDRESS 
While there is much talk about complaints mechanisms as part of the “toolbox” 
system of checks and balances to accompany social auditing, researchers found al-
most no recorded instances of auditors informing workers that there was a means to 
bring complaints after the audit. This means buyers or MSIs either had no complaint 
mechanisms which auditors could recommend to workers, or if they did auditors were 
simply failing to pass on that information, either because they were not instructed to 
or did not see this as part of their job It is beyond most auditors’ mandates to explain 
to workers how they can ﬁle complaints or get help from third parties in the event of 
labour rights violations. This means auditors miss an opportunity to obtain information 
that workers might not be comfortable to give during a face to face interview. Maquila 
Solidarity Network observes that: 
Unless workers have the ability to tell their stories without the threat or perceived 
threat of management or government retaliation for doing so, it will continue to be 
difﬁcult for even well-trained auditors to document real labour practices, as opposed to 
those that appear in company records. 28
 50 51If workers know that their comments are going to make it into audit reports and taken seriously as items that need improve-ment they would be more forthcoming, they might feel more 
conﬁdent about bringing complaints or requesting that im-
provements be made. But in the research carried out for this 
report, it was rare to ﬁnd any examples of an auditors’ report 
being shared with workers or their representatives. 
In most systems in which auditing currently takes place audit 
reports are shared with management only and it is left up to 
them to share the report with workers (and also relevant lo-
cal NGOs and trade unions. Disclosing the ﬁndings with any 
stakeholders others than management is not part of the ma-
jority of the existing systems.
Out of over 40 factories, only auditors from DNV at one 
workplace in south India are said to “have left their ofﬁcial 
and personal contact numbers with workers for further con-
tact”. When asked by researchers, a typical response from 
managers would state that “there is no mechanism by which 
a worker can contact an auditor or the buyer once the audit-
ing process is completed. The worker however can write to 
the management about the working conditions or any other 
problem related to factory. For this purpose the company has 
placed suggestion boxes at various places.” 29 
There is nothing wrong with placing suggestion boxes in the 
factory as part of an internal grievance mechanism, but such 
a system is not the same as a mechanism to allow workers 
to bring complaints to the attention of international buyers, 
when internal grievance systems fail them.
LACK OF SKILL AND EXPERIENCE OF 
AUDITING STAFF
While companies claim that their inspectors are very quali-
ﬁed, there is much evidence that social auditors have little 
relevant work experience and are sent to factories with hardly 
any training at all.30
3 In 2000 Dara O’Rourke pointed out that PwC social audi-
tors were in fact trained ﬁnancial auditors who were given 
a short course in social issues. 
3 Labor Rights in China (LARIC) criticized a training seminar 
for SA 8000 monitors (LARIC 1999) because neither the 
trainer nor the trainees had experience in labour or human 
rights although this did not prevent them from being certiﬁed as capable of verify-
ing working conditions. 
After conducting interviews with ﬁve compliance ﬁrms, Jill Esbenshade (2004) found 
that monitoring ﬁeld investigators often have minimal qualiﬁcations and are chosen on 
the basis of language skills and overseas experience.
 
3 Esbenshade noted that the staff of accounting ﬁrms are “highly trained in calcu-
lation and bookkeeping, which may facilitate addressing wage and hour issues. 
They claim to look beyond surface appearances at systems of operation (i.e. what 
procedures a company has in place). However, they have no professional training in 
other areas such as health and safety, labor law, worker interviews or human rights 
issues. Moreover, most of their business involves helping large corporations best 
manage their resources and maximize proﬁt. It could be argued that their operat-
ing principles do not prioritize the needs of workers and are often antithetical to 
them”.31 
 
The Fair Wear Foundation and the Fair Labor Association have come to similar conclu-
sions. As a result, the FWF set out to create teams of individuals with a variety of 
backgrounds, experiences and skills, while the FLA is shifting the balance of its ac-
credited “independent monitors” away from global ﬁrms either to more specialized 
ﬁrms or to non-proﬁt social auditing organisations, albeit at a very slow pace. One of 
these organisations, COVERCO has noted that social audit teams should incorporate 
a wide range of different abilities, including knowledge of legal, labour and health 
and safety issues, as well as having legal, accountancy, sociology, and investigative 
skills.32 Failing that (which is very likely!), COVERCO hires teams of monitors who are 
from the same social sphere as apparel industry workers, yet have acquired account-
ing or other professional skills. In general, to have better social auditing or monitoring, 
organisations are turning to credible local organisations, most frequently civil society–
based. Such a solution not only implies better quality, but also encourages the promo-
tion of teams made up of local organisations and individuals, which, would seem to be 
a step in the right direction in building local capacity to address labour issues.
While it is clear that a number of organisations are developing higher levels of techni-
cal competence there is currently not enough existing capacity among these organi-
sations to satisfy the social auditing needs of the industry. This is usually cited as 
the key reason for using, in spite of their inadequacies, the larger quality control or 
ﬁnancial auditing ﬁrms. This suggests a need to put greater resources into promoting 
monitoring carried out by or with credible civil society-based groups or local labour and 
other specialists. One former social auditor describes how he got hired:
 
Twelve hours ago I was in the southern California ofﬁces of an independent monitoring 
company that inspects factories for safety violations and human rights abuses through-
out the world. I had been hired over the phone a few days before. My sole qualiﬁcation 
for the job? I speak Chinese and have a friend already working for the company. I as-
sumed that there would be some sort of lengthy training process to teach me how to be 
a human rights inspector. There wasn’t. 33
The ideal monitor would be a  
“labor-lawyer-accountant-sociologist-
investigative-reporter-health and safety 
specialist under thirty” 
COVERCO
The term “complaint” is often used 
interchangeably with “grievance.” 
However, in the context of codes 
of conduct, the term “grievance” is 
usually used with regard to grievance 
procedures at the level of the 
workplace, while the term “complaint” 
is used with regard to code of conduct 
complaints mechanisms at the 
international level. Workplace-level 
grievance systems should deal with 
all forms of worker issues— whether 
code violations or other issues that 
do not relate to code standards (e.g. 
disagreements between workers, 
issues with management style, etc.). 
On the other hand, complaints ﬁled 
with code of conduct complaints 
mechanisms are limited to alleged 
violations of the relevant code. 
All issues (whether referred to as 
complaints, grievances or otherwise) 
should be resolved at as local a level 
as possible.
Grievance and 
complaints 
mechanisms 
Quote 
52 While the above example may not be typical, all the research points to frequent fail-ures of social auditors to identify clear instances of exploitation and abuse of workers. Lack of adequate training seems to be a part of the reason for this problem. 
Gender, language and cultural factors also seem to play a role. 
An ETI project for example found that “women workers were only willing to share their 
experiences of sexual harassment in the workplace if they were talked to in conﬁ-
dence, in their own language and with someone they could relate to and trust”.34 
COVERCO also came to the conclusion that the “monitor’s social class, gender, and 
age, are crucial to the success of interview-based monitoring”.35
Observations made by the manager of a Chinese factory that, with around 20 clients, 
faces a social audit every month, seem to support this view:
The managers said that factory always sails through the checks because most of the 
inspection personnel are from Hong Kong, and it is easy to get them to bend the rules 
a little. When European teams do come in person, they never understand any Chinese, 
and it is short work to ”‘sort out” the translation and ﬁx the problem. Institute of  
Contemporary Observation, China, 2003, factory producing for Debenhams 
The same researcher said that the conscientiousness of social auditors is not neces-
sarily in question, for the most part, but that “the majority have not received training in 
specialised legal knowledge and skills or techniques for interviewing workers”. There 
is sense among some observers that the commercial orientation of most auditors is 
part of the problem. 
Increased competition for contracts among social auditing ﬁrms has recently been 
observed. Commercial audits costing as little as 350 euros are a new phenomenon, 
and suggest that younger, less experienced staff are being taken on to do the job. This 
clearly has negative implications for the overall quality of audits, and should be moni-
tored carefully.
It is sometimes argued that the ILO should play a key role with regard to the training of 
social auditors. In this context, the Better Factories Cambodia project, run by the ILO, 
is generally regarded, including by the international trade union movement, as having 
used monitoring to address the full range of international labour standards, including 
the more difﬁcult issue of freedom of association. 
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 54 55ORIGIN OF THE SOCIAL AUDITING INDUSTRY During the 1990s social auditing turned into a booming 
business. With consumers increasingly voicing concern 
over sweatshop revelations and faced with ineffective state 
labour inspection in developing countries many companies, 
laid the foundations for what is now a sizeable industry. 
Auditing ﬁrms provide services not only to numerous compa-
nies that have adopted ethical standards, but they also play 
a central role in a number of broader initiatives developing 
codes, such as BSCI, WRAP or SA8000 (discussed in chap-
ter 5). Even though the involvement of for-proﬁt auditing 
ﬁrms has provoked criticism from some corners, there is no 
comprehensive overview available of companies involved in 
social auditing. Given the role these ﬁrms play, it is strange 
that there have been so few studies or evaluations carried 
out on their methods, effectiveness and transparency.
 
There are four kinds of organisation involved in social  
auditing: 
1 Global ﬁnancial auditing ﬁrms such as Pricewater-
houseCoopers. Involved early on in social auditing they 
are now however moving out of this area These are for-
proﬁt ﬁrms.
2 Quality control ﬁrms (specialised in testing, inspecting 
and certiﬁcation). These are for-proﬁt ﬁrms often operat-
ing globally. 
3 Specialised, for-proﬁt social audit ﬁrms or consultan-
cies. Some operate globally, some operate only in the 
locality where they are based. 
4 Not-for-proﬁt social audit organisations. Most operate 
only in the locality where they are based. Some, but not 
all, are closely linked to civil society organisations.
GLOBAL FINANCIAL AUDITING FIRMS 
Financial accounting ﬁrms, “with their recognized standards 
and codes of ethics… well positioned to be trusted judges 
of company performance”36 started to offer additional social 
auditing services in the mid-1990s. They moved into the 
ﬁeld because of their long-established relastionships with 
clients seeking social auditing services and also because 
they were seeking to diversity at at time when ﬁnancial 
auditing was experiencing low growth rates.37 Additionally, 
these companies, including PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), 
KPMG, and Ernst and Young, were already operating on a 
global basis and, thus, often already present in many of the apparel-sourcing  
countries.
Today, however, the role of ﬁnancial auditors has decreased signiﬁcantly. Ernst and 
Young and KPMG seem to have minimized their activities in this area, while two of 
PricewaterhouseCoopers’ partners started Global Social Compliance in May 2001, 
which still plays an important role within the social auditing business. Not coincidently, 
this happened after PricewaterhouseCoopers’ auditing practices were heavily criticised 
by Dara O’Rourke in his 2002 article, “Monitoring the monitors: a critique of corporate 
third-party labour monitoring,”38 which focused particularly on the inadequacies of 
PwC. While not providing actual social auditing services, many of these ﬁrms continue 
to provide clients with advice on corporate social responsibility.
QUALITY CONTROL FIRMS 
Quality control ﬁrms (known also as testing, inspecting or certiﬁcation ﬁrms) are also 
active in social auditing. These companies provide services on a global basis regard-
ing manufacturing, design and sourcing. 
Interaction with government labour inspectorates 
In 2002, the CCC reported on the failure 
of the government to protect workers 
in Swaziland. Employers at that time 
were boasting to workers that they 
could easily bribe labour inspectors. In 
2001, the Swaziland industrial court 
had a waiting list of between two and 
ﬁve years. And the labour ministry said 
it was concerned not to “push investors 
too hard”. 
In Madagascar, resources don’t exist 
for factories to be inspected once a 
year, though this is required by law. 
Instead,as a minimum, inspectors 
respond to complaints. But even when 
inspectors ﬁle complaints, they can 
be delayed for years. One unusually 
zealous inspector ﬁled 52 cases with 
the labour court in 1997, and by late 
2001, when interviewed, none had 
come to court! 
De Haan and Phillips (2002)
How labour 
inspection has 
failed workers 
in Swaziland and 
Madagascar
Some say there is no need for private companies 
to be carrying out social auditing, since it is pretty 
similar to the work of labour inspectorates, which are 
responsible for ensuring national labour law is imple-
mented properly. While ideally, this is a fair comment, 
in reality, labour inspectorates are failing to protect 
workers in many of the countries where garments are 
being produced because:
3 there is little incentive for governments to effec-
tively implement international labour standards 
and they often seem to believe (often wrongly) 
that multinationals prefer it if a blind eye is 
turned to labour rights violations in apparel facto-
ries,
3 often workers tend to be employed in such a 
way that national labour laws do not cover them 
as fully as they might—many factories prevent 
workers from receiving a permanent contract, for 
instance, by laying off workers for a short period 
and rehiring them to avoid obligations arising 
from employing someone over a long period,
3 they tend to be under-resourced—stories abound 
of the travel costs of labour inspectors being cov-
ered by employers because they could not cover 
their own costs, and
3 they are reported to be corrupt in some cases, 
taking bribes, for instance, in exchange for turn-
ing a blind eye to labour violations.
The ILO recently found that little or no cooperation 
exists between national governmental inspections 
and social auditors. In recent years, some attempts 
have been made to address this issue. The Gap is 
sponsoring the training of government labour inspec-
tors in Cambodia. Less convincing initiatives have 
included TLS8001, a partnership between SGS and 
the Thai Labour Ministry, and The “Humane Produc-
tion” programme involving Intertek and the Philippine 
Department of Trade and Industry.
 56 57The largest three global companies in this business are Intertek (which owns Labtest), Societé Générale de Surveil-lance (SGS) and Bureau Veritas. Each of these employs 
tens of thousands of people and operates ofﬁces and labs 
all over the world. These kinds of companies inspect the 
production processes of suppliers in order to check whether 
they meet speciﬁcations concerning quantity and quality 
of deliveries, labelling and packaging, as well as whether 
products comply with speciﬁc safety standards, regulations 
or quality and performance criteria set either by the buyers 
or the legal safety requirements of the markets in which the 
products are sold. Increasingly, these ﬁrms now offer social 
auditing services.
Providing certiﬁcation of ISO and other international quality 
or safety standards has become a signiﬁcant global busi-
ness in itself. SGS is the biggest player with over 50,000 
customers and 70,000 certiﬁcates issued worldwide. With a 
market share of about 11%, SGS is ahead of Bureau Veritas 
with 11% and Lloyds with 10%.39
Prior to entering the social auditing ﬁeld they were already 
involved in providing services related to quality certiﬁcation 
standards such as ISO 9000 and environmental standards 
like ISO 14000. 
The certiﬁcation business provides companies that offer 
these services with recurring revenues since the companies 
receiving certiﬁcations are subject to regular “re-audits” 
(every two-to-three years). It was recently noted that the op-
erating margins of Labtest’s code of conduct business are 
higher than the company’s average margins.40 SGS writes 
that they continue to develop new services in the ﬁeld of 
corporate social responsibility that will allow the company to 
enter “new higher value markets”.41 
Other large companies operating in this sector are Det 
Norske Veritas (DNV), which claims to be the number one 
in SA8000 certiﬁcation, and Bureau Veritas Quality Interna-
tional (BVQI). 
SPECIALISED SOCIAL AUDIT FIRMS
A number of companies have sprung up speciﬁcally to pro-
vide services related to code of conduct compliance and 
social auditing. These include Cal-Safety Compliance Corpo-
ration (CSCC) in the United States, which started carrying 
out social responsibility compliance inspections within the apparel industry in 1991. 
Another example is A & L Group Inc., a labour inspection ﬁrm based in New York with 
FLA accreditation. Both companies operate globally.
Esbenshade notes that “(c)onsulting ﬁrms have sprung up in Bangladesh, India and 
Vietnam to do labor monitoring speciﬁcally in those countries and this trend can be 
expected to continue” (2004). These include LIFT-Standards in Bangladesh, T-Group 
Solutions in India, Global Standards/Toan Tin in Vietnam, and WethicA in Europe.
NOT-FOR-PROFIT SOCIAL AUDIT ORGANISATIONS
Non-proﬁt or not-for-proﬁt organisations are supposed to support some issue for non-
commercial purposes, but even though they don’t operate to make a proﬁt they do 
generate revenues to ﬁnance their activities. Usually the organisation has to qualify for 
this status, though this varies per country. There are a number of non-proﬁt organisa-
tions that provide social audit services . The biggest one is Verité, a US-based organi-
sation that started in 1995 with the mission “to ensure that people worldwide work 
under safe, fair and legal conditions”.42 It has done 1,300 factory audits in over 60 
countries. However, as Esbenshade (2004:142) notes, “Verité in many respects (…) 
actually operates as any other commercial ﬁrm. Verité charges standard fees, main-
tains the conﬁdentiality of reports for clients, and conducts one-time or short-term 
audits, often temporarily hiring local employees or bringing in staff from the United 
General Market 
positions of quality 
control ﬁrms 
source: Keusch et al., 2002
Others
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Labtest
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SGS
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BV Group
25%
TEXTILE INDUSTRY
Audit team members should be:
3 knowledgeable of local labour relations,
3 knowledgeable of local law and regulations in 
his/her ﬁeld of expertise. The auditor must 
assess the labour situation against the FWF 
labour standards but also against local law 
and regulations, since the audited companies 
must abide both,
3 have the social skills to easily relate with the 
different parties involved: management, work-
ers, unions, NGOs and local authorities and 
to have a balanced view of the interests that 
are at stake,
3 able to understand the views of workers and 
management. Especially, the auditor who per-
forms worker interviews should have previous 
experience in relating with workers,
3 committed to improve the situation for  
workers,
3 able to communicate in English preferably in 
order to make communications easier. The 
writer of the audit report must be able to 
write in English,
3 reliable persons and respect the conﬁdential-
ity of the facts and data to which they will 
have access. They may under no circumstanc-
es disseminate any piece of information oth-
erwise than through the reporting prescribed 
in the FWF manual, and
3 a conﬂict of roles must be prevented, thus 
inspectors should not have any other formal 
or informal relation with the factory that they 
inspect.
 
Fair Wear Foundation Audit Teams
 58 59States. While advertising itself as the only non-proﬁt with a global monitoring program, Verité actually straddles the line between commercial ﬁrm and local NGO.”  
Other non-proﬁt organisations carrying out labour inspec-
tions and monitoring include GMIES, in El Salvador, and the 
previously mentioned COVERCO, based in Guatemala but 
also operating internationally. They differ from Verite in that 
they both have far stronger roots in civil society movements 
in their home countries and work intensively with local civil 
society organizations through trainings and collaborative initia-
tives.43 The Fair Wear Foundation also seeks to ensure that 
the members of their audit teams have a strong linkage with 
local civil society groups. 
SIZE AND GROWTH: HOW MANY SOCIAL 
AUDITS ARE TAKING PLACE?
No comprehensive ﬁgure is available on the number of so-
cial audits taking place each year. One specialist estimates 
around 30,000.44 Though commercial audit ﬁrms generally 
do not disclose the number of social audits they carry out in 
the garment industry per year, it is clear that the number has 
increased dramatically during the last few years. As demon-
strated by the following summary of what is known of recent 
social auditing activity or plans for future auditing activity, the 
number of audits in this ﬁeld could easily run into tens of 
thousands of audits.45 
3 Commercial social audit ﬁrm CSCC claims to conduct over 
11,000 inspections annually for a variety of industries.46 
3 Gertie Knox, the chief operating ofﬁcer of Global Social 
Compliance (formerly part of PricewaterhouseCoopers), 
claimed they undertook 25,000 audits between 1996 and 
2001.47 
3 PwC performed 6000 factory audits in 2000 in 60 coun-
tries in 2000.48 
3 Verité claims that since its founding in 1995, it has con-
ducted approximately 1,300 audits in 65 countries.49 
3 In 2003, FLA monitors conducted 110 independent moni-
toring visits in twenty countries. An even bigger number of 
FLA related audits took place internally, e.g.: Nike did 860 
internal audits, Reebok 274 and Adidas 257.50 
3 As of March 2005 Social Accountability International (SAI) 
has certiﬁed 655 facilities in 44 countries and 50 differ-
ent industries. It is not known how many factories were 
audited but failed to achieve SA8000 certiﬁcation. 
3 775 factories in over 85 countries have been certiﬁed to be in compliance with 
WRAP 12 standards. In the last two months of 2004, 12 factories were de-certi-
ﬁed because they failed unannounced follow-up evaluations. It is not clear how 
many factories failed WRAP certiﬁcation.51
3 In 2002, ETI member companies reported a total of 7,731 “evaluations”.
3 Within the Fair Wear Foundation, member companies have to audit labour condi-
tions themselves, while the FWF audits a portion of member’s suppliers. The facto-
ries for external veriﬁcation are selected randomly. Every three years the FWF will 
conduct audits at 10% of each member company’s supplier facilities.52 
3 Initiative Clause Sociale announced the completion of 715 social audits. 
While this seems like quite a lot of activity it still remains likely that most garment 
production workplaces have not been audited. Using the above incomplete information 
as a base, one could make a rough estimate that out of a possible total of 200,000-
300,000 clothing workplaces in the world today, around 10% are audited each year. 
It is also unlikely that in auditing that 10% that the worst of the rights violations tak-
ing place in the industry are coming under scrutiny. In its 2002-2003 annual report 
the ETI noted “companies prioritise the auditing of ﬁrst tier suppliers. Our experience 
shows that serious labour problems are more likely in the further reaches of the sup-
ply chain”. 
But even though only a fraction of the total workplaces are being audited, manufac-
turers have complained that the multitude of “audits divert management time and 
resources, disrupt workﬂow, and challenge planning processes”.53 Though these prob-
lems are no doubt real enough for the manager, from a worker perspective, the intend-
ed beneﬁciaries of this process, having multiple audits is not an issue of concern. The 
bottom line is whether audits lead to improvements. 
A major concern for the CCC is that the garment industry is tempted to improve ef-
ﬁciency by minimizing the number of audits, regardless of their effectiveness, rather 
than aiming to be more efﬁcient and effective in improving the implementation of their 
codes of conduct. The trend that currently emerging is for industry to develop a single 
compliance model that is weaker than existing standards and relies heavily on global 
audit ﬁrms—this is the case with the BSCI and WRAP initiatives, which are discussed 
in more detail in chapter 5.
SERIOUS CREDIBILITY PROBLEMS
For-proﬁt monitors have a built-in credibility problem in those systems in which they 
are selected, contracted and paid by the factories they inspect. - Sandra Polaski, a 
former US State Department ofﬁcial responsible for international labour affairs.54 
There is a built-in bias in mainstream social auditing that many companies appear 
to be ignoring at their peril. The very parties who already acknowledge responsibility 
for abusing and exploiting workers over the years are also commissioning the vast 
majority of auditing. It is being done either by sourcing companies themselves, or by 
auditors hired either by the sourcing companies or the suppliers. Therefore, in addition 
Intertek: “Our business philosophy is 
simple; we go where our clients require 
us to go and use our extensive resources 
and expertise to ensure that their needs 
are fulﬁlled.”
Cal-Safety Compliance Corporation 
emphasizes it has experience in “dealing 
with” NGOs, “will coordinate alerts and 
breaking information on NGO activity” 
and “assist clients and interface with 
the NGOs”
A&L Group claims to “provide a 
conﬁdential, personalized service 
and protect our clients’ interests by 
evaluating the social accountability of 
their partners.”
WethicA (Worldwide Ethic Alliance) 
claims to be dedicated to achieving 
“otal Customer Satisfaction”, and to 
represent “an international network of 
skills concerned with participating in the 
generalization of ‘decent’ work, easing 
the access of small and medium sized 
businesses to this action, encouraging 
local initiatives by concomitant 
actions on quality and production, and 
respecting main regional balances”. 
Services offered include a “social audit 
express service within 24/48 hours, 
even at night if permitted by local 
regulations for working hours.”
Verité, works “to ensure that people 
worldwide work under safe, fair and 
legal conditions”.
 
The hype from 
social audit ﬁrms
 60 61to being unqualiﬁed and untrained to the carry out an assign-ment that is often improperly designed (too short and too incomplete) as has been shown in chapter 2 and chapter 3, 
they cannot be seen as fully independent.
This is one of the reasons the more responsive brand name 
companies are unlikely to hold up an audit report as evidence 
to consumers that their supply chains are clean. And this is 
why merely having a factory audited or certiﬁed by one stand-
ard or another is not, on its own, going to protect workers, 
and it is not going to protect a sourcing company from the risk 
that exploitation and abuse will be uncovered at some stage 
in its supply chains. 
Veriﬁcation of audit results by an independent party, not paid 
by the buyer or supplier, is one way in which the credibility of 
auditing can be improved. Veriﬁcation is usually done under 
the auspices of a multi-stakeholder initiative. For instance, 
the Fair Labor Association and the Fair Wear Foundation com-
mission unannounced audits for their member companies, as 
part of the veriﬁcation process.
The Fair Wear Foundation has decided not to work with com-
mercial audit ﬁrms but to train its own audit teams as a 
means to get closer to the workers than has been achieved 
by other auditing approaches.
A number of well-known brand companies using their own 
compliance staff, have started to develop better relations with 
local groups. For example, as a result of the Play Fair at the 
Olympics campaign several sportswear companies have set 
up meetings with trade unions and NGOs in Indonesia, Turkey, 
Bulgaria and Cambodia. 
By contrast, the trend, particularly among retailers, towards 
participation in weaker less-demanding initiatives like the 
BSCI, which overemphasises the role of audits and weakens 
standards in the process (see chapter 5), may mislead buy-
ers into a false sense of security and undermine the progress 
being made in the context of other initiatives.
DIFFICULTIES OF OVERSEEING A SECRETIVE INDUSTRY 
Stories of corrupt social auditing and superﬁcial audits, referred to in chapters 2 and 
3, bring back memories of the complicity of the ﬁnancial auditing industry in the ﬁnan-
cial scandals of the last few years, such as at Enron and WorldCom. It is clearly wrong 
to tell consumers and shareholders that international labour standards in supply 
chains are met with the help of auditors, while the latter, assumed to be the independ-
ent arbiters of rules compliance, have been connected with corruption scandals. Given 
the scale of the industry, and the doubts being raised in this report and elsewhere 
about credibility and effectiveness, it seems fair that the industry be subjected to 
closer scrutiny. Though there is general consensus about which standards should be 
universally respected by employers in supply chains (with the exception of the living 
wage—see chapter 3), there are currently no norms or standards set for how social 
auditors should test for compliance with these standards. This is in contrast to well-
developed norms for ﬁnancial accounting.
However, given the current lack of transparency that characterises the social auditing 
industry a comprehensive review of its functioning would be a difﬁcult undertaking. 
Companies active in this ﬁeld claim that both audit methodology and results must 
remain conﬁdential. 
As noted in Chapter 3, in the research carried out for this report it was rare to ﬁnd any 
examples of an auditors’ report being shared with workers or their representatives. 
This lack of transparency makes a detailed understanding of social auditing methods 
difﬁcult. This note from the Bangladeshi researchers is typical of the challenges faced 
by all researchers in trying to probe the auditing industry:
The research team tried to contact several audit ﬁrms and the compliance section of 
the companies but apart from a few individual informal discussions the team failed to 
have formal interviews with most of them.. …Being a vital stakeholder in the ready-
made garments sector, the unwillingness of audit ﬁrms to share their views on social 
auditing practices reﬂects their lack of transparency and accountability to consumers.
GTZ AVE programme staff in Romania, when quizzed about the detail of audits, for 
instance the checklist that is used during factory visits, revealed very little, saying that 
“these details are conﬁdential—every company has to respect the conﬁdentiality con-
cerning some procedures”.
The ILO held a technical meeting for auditors in May 2005, and auditors there referred 
to “sensitive” methodologies that they would not share with outsiders, since these 
“may tip factory managers on how to pass social audits”. While this may be partly 
justiﬁable, it does not explain the apparently vast numbers of suppliers who are ap-
parently already fooling auditors and passing audits using the various fraudulent tech-
niques described in chapters 2 and 3. The secrecy in which the industry is shrouded 
seems instead to be hiding the weakness of current auditing methodologies and pre-
vent the critical review that is seriously needed to improve quality and oversight. 
“A corporation that thinks that it is 
meaningfully engaging workers by 
indulging in dialogue with itself, even 
if this is disguised by bringing ‘hired 
guns’ into the process, is either fooling 
itself, seeking to fool others, or both. 
Neither the use of professional CSR 
enterprises nor a process of creating 
rather than recognizing interlocutors is 
a viable alternative to engagement with 
workers and their organizations.” Guy 
Ryder, general secretary, International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions
The independence of a social auditor 
can be questioned if: 
 3 they are directly paid by the 
company whose facilities or 
suppliers are being audited, and/or 
3 they provide (or seek to provide) 
other commercial services to the 
same company. 
Dialogue
Independence?
62 One of the few researches evaluating the practice of social auditing lists the following ﬁndings: 
3 inconsistencies between second and third party audits within a same facility, 
3 third party auditors ﬁnd less non-compliance than own compliance staff 
3 freedom of association is interpreted differently according to auditors and MNEs 
are suspicious of deﬁnition given by NGOs, and 
3 auditors describe problems encountered within facilities but do not try to identify 
causes.55 
One OECD report56 has argued that these problems could be addressed by developing 
institutional supports similar to those in ﬁnancial auditing but that this would require 
that standards and methodologies achieve widespread acceptance by the different 
constituencies driving the code of conduct debate. While there are different code com-
pliance initiatives that provide oversight, acceptance of one standard and method is 
as yet non-existent. 
While the OECD report is right that there is no consensus with regard to the institu-
tional structures that deﬁne the steps and statements of a social audit when com-
pared with ﬁnancial audits, critics argue that social auditing should be compared with 
ﬁnancial audits in the ﬁrst place The assumption of the OECD that data about social 
relations (or industrial relations) can be collected and interpreted in a similar way as ﬁ-
nancial data is overlooking important methodological questions concerning the quality 
and nature of this data—such as the notion that there would be “objective evidence” 
to be interpreted by an “objective auditor”—should be challenged.57 This report also 
shows that problems like the violation of freedom of association and discrimination is 
far from being objectively measurable. 
Transparency is an important tool to improve the quality of auditing, and some initia-
tives have demonstrated that more transparency is possible. The Workers’ Rights 
Consortium for example makes its investigation reports public (see chapter 6 for more 
information on MSIs). The FLA produces public tracking charts with the ﬁndings of 
audits58 and the names of the auditors.59 Sadly, EU-based initiatives are currently  
lagging behind in this area. 
Dumbing 
down: 
the trend 
towards 
excessive 
reliance on 
audits
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64 65WHO IS RELYING PRIMARILY ON SOCIAL AUDITING?This chapter focuses particularly on the worrying trend in the growth of retailer-domi-
nated initiatives that rely heavily on social auditing. This development is taking place 
in spite of intensiﬁed criticism of these models in recent years from labour advocates, 
some of the more experienced clothing brands and some suppliers. Three examples 
of such initiatives in the garment industry are the BSCI, WRAP, and ICS, discussed 
below.
BSCI: IS THE RETAIL INDUSTRY LOOKING FOR A QUICK FIX? 
In the last year, efforts have been made by the Foreign Trade Association, a trade as-
sociation which lobbies for freer trade rules to beneﬁt European retailers, to set up a 
new initiative aimed at retailers, building upon the AVE/GTZ audit project. This initia-
tive known as the Business Social Compliance Initiative (BSCI), relies primarily on 
social auditing carried out using a weakened version of the SA8000 auditing standard 
(discussed earlier in this report). The BSCI initiative already has approximately 40 
member companies. 
The BSCI chose to rely predominantly on social audits executed by global quality con-
trol ﬁrms. Social audits are also used in other models of code compliance, including 
multi-stakeholder initiatives, but rarely so exclusively as in this case. The previous 
chapters in this report have laid out the dangers of over-reliance on social auditing, 
listing a range of concerns regarding quality and exclusion of workers from the  
process.
A credible approach towards code compliance would require that quality in-house 
monitoring is accompanied by and complemented with an (independent) veriﬁcation 
system. In such a system, stakeholders would be represented throughout its main 
bodies. The BSCI does not meet these requirements. It has developed a weak moni-
toring system based on social audits. The BSCI does not require its members to have 
an actual programme of work with a clear target with respect to audits, remediation, 
or consultation activities, even though it does mention all these elements. It marginal-
ises the role of stakeholders that are invited to participate in a weak council with only 
an advisory role. By comparison, within the Ethical Trading Initiative, member compa-
nies are obliged to carry out a series of steps in a multi-stakeholder way, through pilot 
projects, and they have to report on what they do to the MSI board. Both the Fair Wear 
Foundation and Fair Labor Association agree on a work plan with their members and 
then verify whether the work plan has been implemented. Since the BSCI has margin-
alised the role of stakeholders, it should be seen as a weak and unveriﬁed form of 
internal company monitoring.
In addition to over-reliance on social audits, the Clean Clothes Campaign has identi-
ﬁed a number of additional weaknesses of the BSCI:60
Minimum (not best!) practice: In the BSCI model, at the level of the labour standards 
themselves, there is a distinction made between “Social Requirements” and “Best 
practice” (based on social auditing standard SA8000). While the BSCI Code includes 
all of the important provisions, it is up to individual members to decide if they want 
to demand compliance on all of these standards. While the BSCI argues that its code 
represents a ﬁrst step towards SA8000 certiﬁcation, it is more likely that this set of 
minimum standards will become the dominant level that suppliers have to meet. How-
ever, this is not how it is presented by BSCI promotional materials, which constantly 
refer to SA8000. In the view of the CCC, it is actually more like “SA8000 lite”. 
That the BSCI model implies the minimum necessary to get by is shown in the case 
of Factory C in Pakistan, producing for KarstadtQuelle, C&A, Disney and Wal-Mart. It 
was audited under the GTZ/AVE scheme, and the factory manager noted that while 
they have two premises in the same industrial area of Karachi, only one was audited. 
When asked why only one unit was audited, the management responded that they 
produce for buyers who wanted them to get AVE qualiﬁcation only in that one unit 
(KarstadtQuelle and C&A are both members of BSCI). Not only would this make it 
easy for the supplier to subcontract work from the “model” unit to the unaudited unit, 
but it also implies that the buyer was more interested in avoiding risk, than in sourc-
ing in a genuinely responsible way. Researchers for this report in Pakistan noted that 
among all factories audited under the AVE scheme, factory managers all denied using 
subcontractors, and that the entire issue seemed to be ignored during the audits (see 
chapter 2 for more information on why subcontracting is an important issue in code 
compliance).
Lack of transparency: The BSCI does not disclose information on factory locations or 
social audits. The results of an audit are sent exclusively to the audited supplier and 
the BSCI member ﬁrm. Even Advisory Council members do not receive audit reports. 
Unlike other initiatives, the BSCI does not publish an annual report, there is no ag-
gregate reporting from its members, and there is no information about the activities 
of member companies, such as the countries where suppliers are located, how many 
suppliers they have, how many of them have been or will be audited. It is therefore 
impossible for interested parties to compare and/or evaluate what a BSCI member 
company is doing. No public information is available on the results of the audits, their 
length and their scope.61 And importantly, workers do not have access to the results 
of an audit. According to GTZ AVE project representatives in Romania, the BSCI model 
stipulates that managers have the responsibility to share the results of an audit with 
workers, but they said “that depends on the factory’s management”. 
Ofﬂoading the cost of compliance onto suppliers: BSCI’s policy regarding the sharing 
of costs related to social audits is a cause for concern—the BSCI states that costs 
related to audits, and resultant remediation actions (known in BSCI parlance as “quali-
ﬁcation”) will be negotiated between BSCI members and their suppliers. The unequal 
power relation between buyers and suppliers will in practice mean that suppliers are 
likely to put up the overwhelming share of the costs related to the monitoring of com-
pliance. Labour advocates have long argued that suppliers must be adequately com-
pensated for the costs involved in meeting compliance. 
The cost issue, moreover, seems to be a big reason for many retailers to join the 
BSCI. With the BSCI retailers make a smaller in-house ﬁnancial and human investment 
66 67in code implementation and compliance than with other initiatives. Although ofﬁcially the cost of getting a supplier qualiﬁed according to the BSCI model is to be shared between buyer and supplier, the reality, according to various sources, is that in virtually 
every case, suppliers are made to bear the cost of getting audited, and remediating 
any problems found in the audits. 
MISLEADING CLAIMS
Ofﬁcially, the BSCI claims that it is not meant to replace any of the established inde-
pendent multi-stakeholder veriﬁcation systems, however at the same time, the BSCI 
presents itself to companies as if it were a multi-stakeholder initiative, and some 
companies have picked up on this message. For example, the Dutch Vereniging of 
Grootwinkel Bedrijven (VGT) decided not to participate in the Fair Wear Foundation, in 
favour of the BSCI. By assigning functions related to complaints handling to the BSCI 
advisory council, and by suggesting that auditors hired by member companies will 
“carry out veriﬁcation” the suggestion is that this model does, in fact, perform such 
functions. In reality, the advisory council is too under-resourced to act as a complaints 
body, meeting only twice a year (and so far, though the BSCI has 40 members it has 
not yet met even once).The GTZ AVE project representatives in Romania were asked 
whether there was any mechanism to contact the auditor or buyer with complaints af-
ter an audit. The answer was “Yes, but we cannot give any details”. To date, it seems 
that there is no mechanism of redress for workers producing for any of the BSCI retail-
ers. The BSCI also lacks credibility: given its status as a business-controlled initiative, 
it does not have the independence to be able to engage in any process of veriﬁcation 
of company compliance claims.
WEAK MULTI-STAKEHOLDER ROUNDTABLES 
The BSCI monitoring system has plans to establish local multi-stakeholder roundtable 
discussions to involve local stakeholders and inform suppliers. Such meetings were 
organized during the AVE project, by the German Ministry of Development Co-operation 
(GTZ) in about 10 countries (usually one or two annually). Reports from local NGOs 
and unions have tended to indicate that the meetings were little more than informa-
tion-exchange exercises, whose participation and agenda were set unilaterally by the 
industry side. While such meetings may be useful, they are not, in themselves, a sign 
of credible multi-stakeholder involvement in a monitoring and veriﬁcation process.
For these reasons, the public will have good reason to doubt whether the BSCI, as it 
claims on its website, either “optimises working conditions” or is delivering “higher 
satisfaction for workers and consumers” and “more efﬁcient implementation proce-
dures than other monitoring systems”. 
 
WRAP: ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO LOWER THE BAR?
The Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production (WRAP) initiative certiﬁes individual 
workplace facilities. It was ofﬁcially launched in 2000. The organisation describes 
itself as “an independent, non-proﬁt corporation dedicated to the promotion and certi-
ﬁcation of lawful, human and ethical manufacturing throughout the world”.62 According 
to WRAP, over 700 international manufacturers with more than 1,500 factories par-
ticipate in the program, while 775 factories in over 85 countries have been certiﬁed. 
WRAP also claims that “the WRAP certiﬁcation is recognized by retailers and manu-
facturers all over the world as the most reliable and economically efﬁcient factory-
based compliance system within the sewn-product industry.” However, the initiative 
has received heavy criticism by unions and NGOs from the early beginning, who argue 
that WRAP was “set up as an industry-dominated project to avoid outside, legitimate 
monitoring.”63 It has accredited most of the global operating audit ﬁrms mentioned in 
this report, including Intertek, Bureau Veritas, SGS, CSCC, and A & L. This example 
of a WRAP-certiﬁed factory (see box) in the Philippines shows how this approach has 
played out in the ﬁeld
In the WRAP model: 
3 the factory bears all costs association with certiﬁcation. 
3 there is no public disclosure of any information which would allow outside bodies 
or consumers to independently evaluate the effectiveness of the auditor’s ﬁndings. 
Auditors unwrapped in the Philippines
Intertek Testing Services Philippines was involved 
in a joint project with the Philippines Department of 
Trade and Industry represented by the Garments & 
Textile Board (DTI-GTEB), in its “Humane Production 
Program”. This program, linked to WRAP, sought to 
demonstrate the industry’s social commitment. Gar-
ment factories had to participate in order to receive 
certain export quotas. 
Intertek was one of the monitoring bodies to carry 
out the GTEB Re-Accreditation Program for the Gar-
ment Manufacturers and Exporters (GME) (Labtest 
News, Vol. 53 Jan 2001). A World Bank report con-
cluded that it has not been possible to assess the 
impact of the initiative (as a) number of high-proﬁled 
cases of non-compliance amongst participating com-
panies suggest that the impact has been less than 
hoped for. 
One of the cases the World Bank seems to refer to is 
Anvil Ensembles Inc., a garment company audited by 
a team composed of authorized auditors and repre-
sentatives from SGV, Intertek Testing Services and 
GTEB, and issued a certiﬁcate of compliance. 
A newspaper report in July 2003, however, revealed 
that workers were being coached to on how to reply 
during inspection interviews and that the company 
manipulated records on minimum wages and with-
holding remittances of their Social Security System 
(SSS) to satisfy periodic audit requirements. In real-
ity, most employees were paid below the minimum 
wage. In addition, the company had been overworking 
its employees to the point of giving them prescrip-
tion pills to keep them awake for 72 hours at a time. 
Anvil’s accreditation was (temporarily) revoked.
68 693 The audits are pre-arranged. 3 Auditors are not required to consult with local workers, trade unions, advocacy groups, NGOs, religious organisations or human rights organisations. 
3 There is no possibility to register complaints to the WRAP “Independent Certiﬁca-
tion Board”. 
ICS - FRENCH RETAILERS BAND TOGETHER
Launched in France, in 1998, Initiative Clause Sociale (ICS) is a collaborative effort 
among leading French retailers coordinated by the main federation of retailers, the 
members of the FCD Fédération des entreprises du Commerce et de la Distribution in 
France and other large retailers. It is intended to lead to a common system for manag-
ing and sharing social audit information.
Each of the member companies uses its own audit system but companies share a 
common framework—“référenciel”—and agree to share information on the results of 
the audits conducted among its suppliers.
The majority of large retailers in France (with the exception of Intermarché) are mem-
bers of the ICS: Auchan, Camif, Carrefour, Casino, Cora, Galeries Lafayette, Leclerc, 
Monoprix, Okaïdi, Groupe PPR –Conforama, Fnac, Printemps, Redcats, Rexel, and Sys-
tème U.
In 2004, ICS announced the completion of 715 social audits (586 initial audits and 
129 follow-up audits) in the following countries: Bangladesh, Brazil, Cambodia, China, 
Korea, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Israel, Morocco, Maurice, Laos, Malaysia, Mexico, Paki-
stan, Philippines, Romania, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, and Vietnam. The fol-
lowing sectors were covered: garments, hi-ﬁ equipment; bags, home, Christmas deco-
rations, garden, household, ofﬁce stationary, leather goods, shoes, furniture, sporting 
goods, stationary, toys, and groceries.
Typically for schemes heavily reliant on social auditing, there is only a limited amount 
of up-to-date and speciﬁc information available regarding the audits conducted by ICS 
member companies. As a result, this monitoring scheme is excluded from the scope 
of this report. It appears, however, that a number of the social audits performed for 
these companies are conducted by the same commercial auditing ﬁrms covered by our 
research.
IMPRESSING CONSUMERS WITH CLAIMS OF COMPLIANCE
While initiatives that are overly reliant on social auditing are clearly found to be insuf-
ﬁcient in meeting the task they set out to do, companies that are members of these 
initiatives continue to incorrectly see participation in such schemes as examples of 
their commitment to ensuring good standards in the workplace.
German BSCI member Peek & Cloppenburg gives a very reassuring message to it’s 
consumers:
It is extremely important to us to offer our customers only goods that have been pro-
duced under humane conditions…. As a retail company that procures goods internation-
ally, we are familiar with the problematic working conditions in some production coun-
tries. We live up to our responsibility, trying to be partners in the joint effort to ensure 
good working conditions. That is why, as early as 1997, P&C created its own supervision 
programme, where specialists control the working conditions and make recommenda-
tions for improvement, where necessary. Wanting to assume even more responsibility, 
we participate in a programme of the Export Trade Association of the German Retail 
Trade (AVE, Cologne) company website
Finnish retailer and BSCI member Kesko also paints a responsible picture:
The supplier can prove that it fulﬁls Kesko’s ethical requirements by obtaining a neutral 
social certiﬁcation for its operations….Kesko wants to cooperate with its suppliers and 
their subcontractors on a systematic, long-term basis to ensure the ethical quality of 
their products. Deviations from Kesko’s ethical principles are handled similarly to devia-
tions from other quality requirements.… The most reliable way for a supplier of proving 
that it fulﬁls Kesko’s ethical requirements is to acquire an SA 8000 certiﬁcate from 
an independent certiﬁcation body or another corresponding audit approved by Kesko. 
Kesko company website
KarstadtQuelle, one of Europe’s biggest retailer, and one of the founders of BSCI, reas-
sures its customers on its website that what it sells is made ethically:
We conduct cooperative partnerships with our suppliers that require them to meet 
quality benchmarks and social standards in their production activities… with purchas-
ing ofﬁces in 26 countries, we too must help ensure equilibrium between economic 
and social progress. Accordingly, the topic of minimum social standards is also a ma-
jor factor in our sustainability policy.64
Consumers might be surprised, then, to learn that KarstadtQuelle was one of the 
companies sourcing from the Spectrum factory, which broke nearly every rule in Kars-
tadtQuelle’s book. In addition to a badly constructed without proper permits, resulting 
in a collapse which claimed 64 lives and left many severely injured (see box for the full 
story), management at Spectrum paid a poverty wage (even below the national mini-
mum wage), denied workers the right to organise, sexually abused female staff, forced 
workers to do more than 100 hours of overtime each month, and 
70 AVOIDING THE COST OF COMPLIANCEWhat if buyers just make the supplier pay for the audit and for the corrective meas-
ures that need to be taken as a result? An audit itself is likely to cost anything be-
tween 350-3500 euros,65 but corrective action can cost a lot more, particularly if it 
involves wage increases or new construction. Ultimately this is not a decision for audi-
tors, but for the buying or sourcing companies who hire them. As noted elsewhere in 
this report, some auditors have observed that those who hire them lack do not always 
want to really detect violations or solve them. The managing director of PwC Investiga-
tions Asia has also been reported saying that companies did not invest enough money 
for social audits to realistically uncover problems and begin to solve them. 
The questions are: Does the client want to do this? Is there a budget? Does the auditor 
really have the ability to do it? 66 
It is clear that for some buyers the cost of compliance, reﬂected in the increased 
price they must pay a supplier to implement reforms and respect labour standards, is 
too high, and they decide to place their orders elsewhere, while ofﬁcially claiming to 
source only from the “model supplier”:
The management of (Factory B) is concerned that some buyers are placing orders with 
factories which are less socially compliant, and passing off what they produce as com-
ing from (Factory B). The management, in an attempt to maintain good relations with 
its clients, does not raise the issue.   Factory B, Morocco, producing for George, Dunnes, 
Zara, Naf Naf, Marks and Spencer and Prenatal.
Labour advocates have long argued that suppliers and buyers have a shared respon-
sibility for the costs of compliance—if they start sourcing from a factory that is not 
compliant with a code, then the buyer should bear some of the costs of bringing the 
supplier into compliance. Initiatives such as WRAP and BSCI, however, tend to shift 
audit costs to the supplier. 
And as has been seen, suppliers tend to do the minimum possible in the process, 
particularly when a buyer is not prepared to contribute to the costs. In such a process, 
it is the worker who bears the cost, through poverty wages, lack of health care, long 
working hours and other forms of exploitation.
If they are serious, companies must invest in compliance. Different sources have indi-
cated67 that, apart from the more responsive companies who have made some invest-
ments in this area, the reality is quite the opposite – companies are tending to try to 
spend less and less on social compliance, both by engaging with less stringent audit-
ing programmes, and by transferring the cost of compliance with standards, to their 
suppliers. For instance nearly every AVE/BSCI-related audit has had to be paid for by 
suppliers, and not by the buyers, although ofﬁcially the AVE/BSCI promotes a negotiat-
ed sharing of audit and remediation costs between supplier and buyer. Romanian sup-
pliers are reported to have shown little enthusiasm for investing their own money in 
the AVE auditing scheme since it is not taken seriously by many buyers, many of whom 
have more rigorous social compliance policies and hold them to a higher standard. 
Spectrum disaster a worst case scenario
When the system fails, it can fail disastrously. All 
that is known about auditing at the Spectrum factory 
in Bangladesh is that the French retailer, Carrefour, 
carried out at least one social audit, and that Kars-
tadtQuelle carried out one quality audit, reportedly 
using the ﬁrm SGS. According to workers interviewed 
for this report, buyers had indeed inspected the 
factory, and the coaching they seem to have received 
indicates some kind of social audit took place.
Workers did not have much idea about audits. Some-
times buyers’ representatives visited the factory but 
they inspected only the quality. The inspection was 
announced earlier and the workers were told to go to 
the factory well dressed. They were also directed not 
to tell the truth about working hours, wages, over-
time, leave and other issues. The child workers were 
given leave while buyers were visiting the factory.
Not only was the factory a health and safety hazard 
lacking planning permission and waiting to col-
lapse—prior to the disaster it was also the site of 
severe exploitation and abuse of workers.
3 Overtime was mandatory for the workers. A 
worker had to do more than 100 hours overtime 
in a month. 
3 There were no holidays for the workers if produc-
tion ran on; they did not have any leave facilities. 
3 Sexual harassment was common in the factory. 
Workers stated that one of the directors was 
involved in sexual abuse of female workers. The 
director had a well-decorated special room for 
doing this. If any woman protested she would be 
dismissed and those who submitted received 
special privileges. 
3 There was no maternity leave though women 
workers could get a chance to continue work 
after leaving the factory for a pregnancy. 
3 There was no union in the factory. The manage-
ment did not allow it. 
3 Workers were “terrorized” by the management 
and staff. This included beating by the security 
ofﬁcer. 
3 The minimum wage of the factory was less than 
the minimum wage ﬁxed by the government, 
which in turn falls far short of a living wage. A 
helper’s monthly wage was 700 taka. With over-
time they could hardly earn more than 1300 taka 
a month.
3 There was a night shift in the factory from 10 
p.m. to 7 a.m. According to Bangladesh law, 
women workers cannot work the night shift 
though Spectrum regularly violated this law. Two 
women workers, Momtaz and Alea, died in the 
April 11th collapse. Alea was seven months 
pregnant. 
3 Workers were not allowed to leave the premises 
even if they were sick.
3 There were no health and safety systems or 
medical facilities in the factories. There was no 
medical leave for the workers. . Even for very 
simple problems they had to go to a doctor or 
hospital. Workers were the only ones to help any 
sick fellow worker, including those hurt in work-
place accidents.
3 Three months before the collapse, a woman 
worker, Latifa, was injured by an electric shock 
from an 11 KV line which was adjacent to an 
exit door. She was under treatment at a clinic in 
Dhaka. The company did not take any initiative to 
arrange or support her treatment. 
3 Dyeing section worker Mohan died from burns ob-
tained from a leaking hot water boiler. The com-
pany did not pay any compensation to his family. 
Workers donated some money to his family
3 Worker-management communications were 
dysfunctional. For example, ﬁve days before the 
factory collapsed, a store worker informed an 
engineer in the factory that there were cracks in 
the wall. He was told he didn’t understand and 
should go back to work and not talk about this 
with other colleagues. Before it collapsed, the 
factory was producing clothes being sold by Zara-
Inditex, KarstadtQuelle, Steillman, Cotton Group, 
Wal-Mart and Carrefour. All these companies rely 
on various auditing programmes, either in-house 
or via the BSCI. Failures of all of these systems 
Continue on page 72
Another cost factor is the in-house staff. There is a wide variety in the investment 
that companies make in their social compliance department. Nike and Gap employ 
close to a hundred staff, smaller companies like adidas and H&M employ dozens, but 
KarstadtQuelle, one of Europe’s largest retailers, employs only six, which seems to be 
common among multiple retailers who have invested far less so far into this area. 
ARE WE FORGETTING THE LESSONS LEARNED? 
By increasing reliance on third party auditors, buyers have less and less connection 
with their suppliers and their employees. Perhaps the single most important conclu-
sion from the above is that companies using initiatives such as WRAP and BSCI are 
placing an ever-greater distance between the buyer and the workers producing their 
products. By cutting workers out of the process in this model, they risk turning back 
the clock on valuable progress that has been made elsewhere.
At a point in time when there is so much energy to improve the lives of workers in sup-
ply chains, others are missing the chance to help build a sustainable model of code 
compliance. Instead, they risk supporting a model that fools consumers and achieves 
only limited risk management. It is particularly striking that this is happening in 2005, 
when so many companies learned their lessons on this issue three or four years ago.
06
Social 
auditing 
that matters 
to identify and remediate the extreme 
problems faced by the workers at Spec-
trum show graphically why there is no 
quick ﬁx to the issue of ethical sourc-
ing. To date, both Carrefour and Kars-
tadtQuelle have refused to share their 
audit reports with the relatives of the 
disaster victims, or to others, including 
the CCC, campaigning for compensation 
for those who died, were injured, or who 
lost their jobs as a result of the factory 
collapse.
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74 75SOCIAL AUDITING CAN BE EFFECTIVE: THE TOOLBOX APPROACHSince the “cat and mouse” game between auditors and factory managers is likely to 
go on indeﬁnitely, with growing levels of sophistication on both sides, the quest for a 
perfect audit methodology is unrealistic. In spite of the thousands and thousands of 
audits which are taking place year upon year, the patterns of exploitation and abuse of 
workers is continuing. 
Given the amount of resources and thinking devoted to tackling the difﬁculties faced 
by workers in supply chains over the last decade and a half, the lack of progress to 
date is scandalous. The cases mentioned in this report are merely examples of a 
what is a systemic problem. 
Currently, many social audits are being over-relied upon by company or company-led 
initiatives— for the most part not only are they failing to provide an accurate and 
comprehensive picture of working conditions, but they are frequently being used out of 
context, particularly in the cases of BSCI and WRAP.  An audit, used alone, can never 
produce change—it can only produce a “shopping list” of items to be remedied. To 
produce change, a more comprehensive approach is clearly needed. 
Until audits are used intelligently, as part of a broader more comprehensive approach, 
they will achieve little more than superﬁcial change for workers. And until workers, the 
intended beneﬁciaries in the process, are placed at the centre of efforts to improve 
workplace conditions—from conception to implementation of those efforts—they will 
continue to be the losers. 
WHY WE NEED MORE THAN AUDITING 
Auditing is a critical ﬁrst step towards trading ethically, but we also need to look beyond 
audits for their own sake. Sourcing companies need to remind themselves that auditing 
is only a means to an end, and that it is only one piece in the jigsaw of ethical sourcing. 
A supplier’s perspective, ETI Annual Report, 2002-2003
The challenge facing the clothing industry is not to show demonstrate to labour rights 
advocates such as the CCC that they are carrying out more audits, but that workers’ 
lives are improving.
As has been shown by the research in this report, the current emphasis of buyers, 
particularly retailers, on social audits comes at the expense of other tools or mecha-
nisms that would help to achieve compliance with ethical standards. One impact of 
this is that workers and their representatives remain peripheral to processes meant to 
ensure their rights. The Hong Kong Christian Industrial Committee (HKCIC) questions 
the usefulness of audits in general, if they are not part of a broader and more long-
term program. They express serious concerns about the proportion of time spent on 
auditing versus worker-oriented programs such as health and safety or worker rights 
training. According to the HKCIC, auditing should not be viewed as an end in itself. 
Conﬁrmation of violations revealed during workers’ interviews should only be the be-
ginning of the process that leads to workplace improvements and worker  
empowerment. 
Worse still, as has been shown in chapter 3, social auditing can actually transfer pow-
er away from workers. With the setting up of unrepresentative “worker committees” in 
order to please auditors, proper industrial relation systems based on collective bar-
gaining and freedom of association can easily be undermined. 
The evidence shows that credible efforts to implement codes of conduct cannot rely 
on social auditing alone, important though it is. Quality social auditing should be com-
bined with other tools to address and remediate violations of workers rights, including: 
3 partnership with local organisations,
3 grievance and complaints mechanisms, 
3 education and training, 
3 a pro-active approach to freedom of association, 
3 addressing existing business or purchasing practices, 
3 effective remediation, and
3 transparency.
This more comprehensive “toolbox” approach must be adopted by sourcing compa-
nies if they want to make a credible effort to face up to their responsibilities to work-
ers in their supply chains. 
This vision, however, is a far cry from the continuing tendency of many companies to 
rely heavily on audits to identify non-compliance, which might even result in an order 
being cancelled. An ILO report argues that the threat of order cancellation “cuts to the 
core of the whole practice of auditing: If there are no sanctions for non-compliance, 
then auditing has little real meaning or material impact. However, if orders are cut to 
a non-compliant factory, the factory may be forced to shut down, and the now unem-
ployed workers are likely to be worse off than before”.68 
However, referring to initiatives by some of the more responsive companies, the same 
ILO report adds that today it is increasingly recognized that buyers and auditors have 
to put more emphasis on remediation and dialogue than on “policing”. 
Auditing is still seen as a test, but one which increasingly highlights opportunities for 
improvement, rather than grounds for the termination of orders. 
PARTNERSHIP WITH LOCAL ORGANISATIONS
I propose that if social organizations, like yours, trade unions and the inspectors of the 
buyers audit together, things for the workers may change. But my fear is that when and 
if that happens, at the time of the inspection the employers will lock their units and 
proper auditing will be made impossible. The system needs to be changed. Md Ateeq, 
President, Delhi Leather Karigar S angathan Trade Union, India
76 77Code initiatives need to expand the space for dialogue with Southern stakeholders. Moreover, if local unions and NGOs are to participate effectively in code implementa-tion, for example, in providing worker education, code initiatives need to support them 
with appropriate training. Report on the ETI Biennial Conference 2003
The experiences of workers around the world point to a clear weakness in the cur-
rent approaches to social auditing—they simply are not delivering the quality needed 
to identify most code compliance problems. There is a growing realisation, in some 
quarters, that unions and NGOs need not only to be involved in all phases of the code 
implementation, but they should be better consulted on how best to organise the 
entire process.
Labour-related NGOs and trade unions have to be involved in preparing and following 
up audits at the production level if good quality monitoring and credible veriﬁcation is 
to take place. The precise role that these groups should play in monitoring and veri-
ﬁcation systems is still something that needs considerable attention, as the varied 
contexts found throughout the global garment industry mean that what works or is 
appropriate in some situations might not be feasible in others. 
The only effective way of monitoring the implementation of codes of conduct is by 
workers themselves through their trade unions, which of course requires strong indus-
trial relations. Gap Inc. is trying such an approach. They have arranged for a shop stew-
ard in one of their sourcing factories in Kenya to report weekly to Gap on conditions in 
the factory. Such an approach is not only sustainable, it should also empower the trade 
union concerned and provide a clear channel for workers to voice their concerns over 
working conditions. ETI Annual Report 2003/2004
Under the auspices of a number of multi-stakeholder initiatives, and some unilateral 
steps taken by larger ﬁrms such as Nike, adidas, Reebok and Gap, some signiﬁcant 
improvements have been seen in terms of efforts to build partnerships with local 
trade unions and NGOs. 
Only in the case of the H&M auditing team did we ﬁnd that they’d contacted the trade 
union in the factory during audits. For the rest of the companies, trade unions are in-
formed about the clients’ codes of conduct in the company, and that is all. There are no 
contacts with NGOs. General comment from researchers in Romania
A standard part of the practice of the Fair Wear Foundation is to involve local organisa-
tions in each country in:
3 training of audit teams,
3 advising on how the process is conducted, and
3 priorities for remediation.
 
 GRIEVANCE AND COMPLAINT MECHANISMS
Labour advocates have long emphasised the importance of a mechanism to handle 
complaints in code monitoring and veriﬁcation systems.69 A complaints mechanism 
would create an opportunity for workers to bring workplace concerns to the attention 
of the MSI or sourcing company. Such a mechanism is not only a way to ensure direct 
input at any time from workers and their organisations in the monitoring/veriﬁcation 
process, it might also balance and supplement the limitations of “snapshot auditing” 
which only allows workers to voice their grievances once every three years, or whenev-
er the auditor sees ﬁt to come by. Setting up a complaints mechanism must be done 
carefully because workers must have safe and sound means to register complaints, 
with absolutely no fear of retaliation for doing so. 
Apart from one exception, on the part of DNV in south India, it proved impossible to 
ﬁnd any evidence of social auditors providing workers with any means of making com-
plaints to auditors or buyers, let alone informing workers of any complaints mecha-
nisms.
Eventually, two components must be in place:
3 a proper worker/employer grievance handling system must be in place at the level 
of the supplier, and
3 a means must exist by which workers or their representatives can take a com-
plaint up to the level of the buyer, if it is not solved by the supplier.
Regarding the ﬁrst point, companies need to create the infrastructure to deal with 
complaints by recognising trade unions and providing paid time off for trade union 
representatives to be trained in resolving disputes over employment rights, and devel-
oping conﬁdential and accessible means for workers to report exploitation and abuse. 
Regarding the second point, MSIs like ETI, FWF and FLA in theory require from their 
members that they establish such a mechanism, and also provide an option for ﬁl-
ing complaints to the initiative itself. Although experiences with handling complaints 
within MSIs have garnered some results, they have also shown that this requires 
huge amounts of resources and professional handling. The Worker Rights Consortium 
(WRC) is one of the best developed complaints-based systems, that starts to function 
when workers, or organisations representing workers, “pull the ﬁre alarm”. 
EDUCATION AND TRAINING
Codes cannot be effective when workers are not aware that they exist, nor of the 
rights enshrined in them, nor of the means available to exercise these rights. 
“Awareness of codes is crucial for workers to have faith and fully participate in audits, 
and for the beneﬁts of code implementation to be sustainable. Appropriate education 
will not only increase workers understanding of the issue, but will also build workers’ 
conﬁdence to address them.”70 
78 79First attempts to ensure this largely consisted of translating the codes and pasting them to the wall, and/or handing out leaﬂets or cards with the code standards to work-ers. When realizing that in and of itself this does not create an informed workplace, 
more responsive companies have engaged with trade unions and NGOs in developing 
more in-depth education and training programmes and pilot projects. Though the scale 
of these remains far too small, it is striking that many of the companies named in this 
report that have codes do not seem to have taken even the elementary ﬁrst steps in 
informing workers. 
Experiences thus far point to the importance of ensuring that workers are provided 
with the time necessary to participate in such programmes, and re-assurance that 
they will not lose their jobs if they get involved. It is also crucial to provide education 
on workers rights in the context of national labour law, not just on codes of conduct. 
It is also important to distinguishing between education and training: education is a 
process whereby people learn about something in order to draw their own conclusions. 
Training, by contrast, provides information and skills for a particular purpose. 
Providing for education and training is especially important to ensure freedom of as-
sociation, as was also argued by auditors at the ILO Technical Meeting in Turkey this 
year, where participants called for managers as well as workers to be offered training 
on workers’ rights. 
A real issue of concern among labour rights groups is the extent to which worker edu-
cation and training programmes are conducted independent from management inﬂu-
ence, and the terms should not be developed or set by the buyers. Concerns are al-
ready being expressed that worker education may be seen as another potential growth 
industry, and some ﬁrms presently involved in social auditing are already positioning 
themselves to offer services in this area. Obviously this raised concerns for quality 
and credibility. It has also been found that it is extremely important what kind of or-
ganisation gives the training and how it is delivered—workers tend to trust education 
delivered by their own peer group. 
ADDRESS PURCHASING PRACTICES
The management always ﬁnds itself between a rock and a hard place—right now it 
can’t see the results of social audits. The changes which need to be made as a result 
are expensive, and the prices paid by the buyers don’t cover these costs. Factory B, Mo-
rocco, producing for George, Dunnes, Zara, Naf Naf, Marks and Spencer and Prenatal.
Companies need to address the conﬂicting logic of simultaneously pursuing lower 
prices and shorter delivery times whilst at the same time pursuing compliance with 
labour standards.71 In practice, companies often run parallel and often uncoordinated 
systems: one to assure the maximizing of proﬁts and one to assure compliance with 
ethical standards.72 Current purchasing practices on the part of buyers tend to under-
mine the capacity of the supplier to comply with labour standards. And when buyers 
make the ethically questionable choice to source from countries that outlaw or restrict 
freedom of association, such as China or Vietnam, it is even more likely that workers 
and their organisations will be marginalised or excluded from the mechanisms set up 
to implement, monitor or verify code compliance. While no boycott of such countries 
is being proposed, the choice to move production to these places does have seri-
ous implications, since the ability to join and form unions of their choice is after all a 
fundamental workers’ right and in the end, without the ability for workers’ to exercise 
such a right code compliance programmes cannot be sustainable in the long term. 
Auditors at the ILO technical meeting noted that in order to tackle compliance prob-
lems related to excessive or forced overtime, buyers would need to work with suppli-
ers to ﬁx the problem by giving more lead time on orders, and that third party auditors 
may be ill-equipped to address the important issue of the good relationship between 
buyer and supplier. It seems that by fully relying on third parties (instead of on their 
own compliance staff) to carry out the social audits and organize the remediation or 
corrective action as well, buyers are failing to build the very relationship with suppliers 
that will help improve compliance.
Echoing the assertions of Oxfam’s 2004 publication, Trading Away Our Rights, this 
same group of auditors observed that there is much that a buyer can do to address 
the root cause of compliance failure internally, by improving purchasing practices:
Close cooperation between the buying and selling ﬁrm may also help in the practical 
implementation of the codes of conduct. A common example that was cited is that it is 
hard to comply to overtime rules when lead times given by multinationals are so short. 
Increased lead time in this case would reduce the pressure on overtime worked to ﬁll 
the order, but this requires close cooperation between the selling ﬁrm and the people at 
the multinationals who are familiar with the buying process and also the procurement 
process. A closer integration of the two departments at the level of the multinational 
(buying/procurement and compliance/CSR) is therefore recommended to achieve the 
objective of code of conduct implementation. ILO, 2005
While buyers need to make their future business with suppliers and sub-contractors 
conditional based on their compliance record, they should avoid terminating these 
business relationships in order to avoid their commitments under their own codes.
A PRO-ACTIVE APPROACH TO FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 
Lacking a true channel of representation of workers’ problems, external auditing con-
ducted by the buyers becomes a management issue between the suppliers and the 
buyers only. In all the facilities researched, workers are not informed or involved in any 
sense. They are treated as objects to be inspected and questioned during the audit. 
General comment from researchers in China.
This report shows once again workers and their representatives remain peripheral to 
processes meant to ensure their rights, despite the fact that from an efﬁciency point 
of view alone this makes no sense. It has been pointed out many times that the best 
auditors are the workers themselves since they are continually present at the produc-
tion site.
80 81Where workers can form independent trade unions and bargain, there may be little need for a code of conduct. Neil Kearney, ITGLWF and Dwight Justice, ICFTU (2003) 
This observation does not come only from the side of the labour movement: a World 
Bank consultation among 194 individuals representing a variety of stakeholders, such 
as buyers, suppliers, NGOs, unions, and workers, resulted in the observation that 
currently, one of the main barriers to effective code implementation is the “absence 
of a comprehensive and accountable means of engaging workers as well as their un-
ions.”73
Another important element of the toolbox therefore is a policy of promoting freedom 
of association, the right of workers to join and form trade unions and to engage in 
collective bargaining. To do this, companies need to undertake concrete activities to 
promote freedom of association, collective bargaining and credible worker presenta-
tion. Such positive measures are particularly important in situations where workers 
are faced with oppression and can include: 
3 provision of clear and country speciﬁc guidance on what is expected from suppli-
ers concerning compliance with the standards on freedom of association and col-
lective bargaining, and what constitutes appropriate consultative and representa-
tive mechanisms. Such guidance shall be consistent with the meaning of freedom 
of association developed through ILO procedures, 
3 open communication of this policy to national governments,
3 support for and facilitation of training of management, workers and workers’ repre-
sentatives (separately and jointly) in freedom of association, collective bargaining 
and labour-management relations. Such training should take into account the gen-
dered nature of the workforce in the industry. Buyers should ensure the full com-
mitment of suppliers in these initiatives,
3 review supplier policies and procedures (hiring, promotions, termination, discipli-
nary, and grievance), 
3 consult with external sources in order to ascertain anti-union behaviour, the history 
of labor relations in the area, government policy, and union history in the factory, 
and
3 encourage or set up programs to open and improve channels of communication 
between workers and management.
Some of the more responsive brands have started to undertake or stimulate pro-
grammes at suppliers to improve worker-management communication. Usually these 
involve some type of training, and/or establishing mechanisms for workers representa-
tion or bodies for worker-management dialogue. Though such programmes might lead 
to increased space for workers to represent their own interests via organisations that 
they own and control, this is by no means certain. They can also have the exact op-
posite effect. Once more, a key issue is who designs and delivers these programmes, 
and whether they follow the ILO jurisprudence and standard-setting on this topic, for 
example regarding the need for worker representatives to be freely elected. The other 
key issue is the legal context in which they take place. 
REMEDIATION
As the previous chapters have revealed, for the most part social auditing is presently 
conﬁned to developing a shopping list of problems. Auditors lack the right skills, and 
workers are largely excluded from the process, which makes the shopping list incom-
plete. But even a quality audit in and of itself can never produce change. For this to 
happen, a remediation (also known as corrective action) process needs to be devel-
oped, agreed upon and implemented. This means ﬁrst and foremost to analyse what 
causes the violations, and not conﬁne the audit to listing what went wrong. To remedi-
ate something, one needs to understand why it went wrong. This makes it even more 
crucial to improve the quality and capacity of the auditors. 
Presently, identifying what remediation or corrective action is necessary is largely left 
to the auditors, and acting upon it is left to the supplier. Management will be informed 
where they fail to “pass” a requirement in the exit meeting, which may be combined 
with a few suggestions related to occupational health and safety improvements, but 
there is no feedback to the workers, no consultation of workers organizations on 
what would constitute effective remediation and often no negotiation with the buyers 
on this. It shouldn’t be surprising that the effect is limited. Leaving out the workers 
means that the solutions are top-down, unlikely to be effective and difﬁcult to sustain. 
As the section on purchasing practices shows, leaving out the buyer means that the 
costs of compliance are left fully to the supplier, and no incentives are set. Expecting 
results becomes even more unrealistic. 
This report shows that, with a few exceptions, workers do not see real improvements 
in their situation even when regular auditing takes place. Unfortunately it has been im-
possible for the researchers and for CCC to obtain access to remediation or corrective 
action plans developed post-audit, so an analysis of the audit ﬁndings, the follow-up 
corrective action suggested and the reality could not be made. 
The majority of the audit ﬁrms described in this report seem to lack not only the skills 
but also the legitimacy and the mandate to develop and organise appropriate correc-
tive action or remediation programmes. Even more disturbing, the evidence seems to 
indicate that after producing an audit report, the process effectively stops. 
Remediation plans should be developed based on an analysis of the root cause of 
rights violations and their impact, in a process that involves workers, management and 
buyers. Implementing remediation plans, is a joint responsibility of suppliers and buy-
ers. Buyers have a responsibility to create an enabling environment for remediation to 
take place (ex. commitment to long-term relationship and not cut and run, cost sharing 
when necessary, and to consider their purchasing practices so that improvements can 
be implemented and sustained). 
82 83NEED FOR TRANSPARENCYBoth the garment industry and the auditing industry deeply lack transparency when it 
comes to where, how, by whom and for how much they make their products. There of-
ten seems to be no real reason for the extremely high levels of secrecy: why shouldn’t 
workers and their organisations have access to audit reports, or remediation plans? 
Why can’t brands or retailers publish whom they hire to audit which factory? Or who 
pays for the audit? Why shouldn’t audit ﬁrms put up a list of their clients, and report 
on what methods they use and how they train their staff? Transparency is crucial to 
build credibility among stakeholders and the public at large, to improve the quality and 
effectiveness of auditing, to make complaints mechanisms work, to minimize the inef-
ﬁcient use of resources and in general to improve the compliance mechanisms pres-
ently under development.
Garment companies should be taking steps to increase transparency regarding the 
composition and conditions of their supply chains. Several brands have recently begun 
to publish more in-depth social responsibility annual reports, and even details of the 
composition of their supply chains. In its recent corporate responsibility report Nike ar-
gues that disclosure of supply chains is key to unlocking greater collaboration among 
brands and creating the incentives necessary for factories. 
Companies should also provide more in-depth and detailed information about code 
implementation activities: the procedures they have adopted and the activities they 
have undertaken, including audits, to implement the code. They should provide details 
of non-compliance and of remedial action undertaken, as well as of complaints and 
how these complaints were addressed. 
Ensuring feedback to the workers themselves should be a priority. The information 
provided should be veriﬁed. 
Audit ﬁrms should disclose all information necessary so that their methods and effec-
tiveness can be assessed. 
DON’T GO IT ALONE!
 
It is increasingly clear that some companies are making some progress by learning 
from their peer group and building on the lessons learned by others. The lessons tend 
to revolve around the need to engage the primary beneﬁciaries of the process— work-
ers—in the design and implementation of programmes to ensure international labour 
standards are respected in supply chains. 
The rise of multi-stakeholder initiatives, which allow companies to learn from each 
other at the same time as to listen to representatives of workers, is a sign that com-
panies are trying to improve, although most still have a long way to go. 
Corporations need to cooperate at a sectoral level on code compliance issues. In the 
end, companies cannot unilaterally address the problems that are faced industry-wide, 
particularly since most suppliers are servicing more than one buyer at a time. System-
atic problems at both the point of production and the point of consumption can only 
be successfully addressed through a multilateral, sector-wide approach. 
As Doug Cahn, Reebok’s vice president for human rights, argues, “we may be only 
20% of a particular supplier’s business and thus have little inﬂuence, but when we can 
combine with two other companies that each have 20%, we can leverage our inﬂuence 
over that factory operator”.74 
To avoid the dumbing down identiﬁed in chapter 5 in relation to the retail industry, 
such a sector-wide approach can only be successful if it is based on the highest com-
mon denominator and current best practice. Business-dominated CSR programs tend 
to be examples of “lowest common denominator” collaboration. These include the 
BSCI, discussed in chapter 5, and the CSR activities in recent years of the World Fed-
eration of the Sporting Goods Industry (WFSGI).75
BUILDING CREDIBILITY: WORKING IN MSIS
Playing an active role in credible multi-stakeholder initiatives can also be a valuable 
step for companies to take in improving their code compliance work. In the apparel 
and (athletic) footwear industries the most important MSIs are the Fair Labor Associa-
Soon after companies started to adopt codes of 
conduct it became clear that there was a need for an 
overarching system for evaluating company claims 
about compliance with labour standards. This stimu-
lated the creation of a number of MSIs, which involve 
a variety of companies, NGOs and/or trade unions 
trying to develop (more) systematic approaches to 
code implementation, monitoring and veriﬁcation, as 
well as developing structures for accountability to 
civil society.
These initiatives have the following in common. They: 
3 bring a wider range of actors into decision-making 
procedures,
3 agree upon a standardized code of conduct  
generally informed by ILO standards, and
3 concur upon follow-up activities designed to  
put labour standards into effect.
To a varying degree they might also: 
3 use social audits as a mechanism for  
monitoring/verifying codes of conduct, 
3 authorise or accredit organisations to conduct 
the veriﬁcation process, 
3 certify workplaces or branded companies, 
3 promote social dialogue and learning between 
different stakeholders, 
3 facilitate the processing of complaints from  
workers, trade unions or NGOs as part of the 
monitoring/veriﬁcation process, 
3 stimulate stakeholder participation in code  
veriﬁcation at points of production, and
3 get ﬁnancial or facilitative support from  
governments.
These initiatves have provided new forms of social 
dialogue where different stakeholders regularly meet, 
exchange views or devise joint projects. 
Merk, 2005b
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84 tion, the Worker Rights Consortium, the Ethical Trading Initiative, Social Accountability International and the Fair Wear Foundation. 
None of these initiatives should be seen as the deﬁnitive answer to a company’s code 
compliance problems; and there are varying and serious concerns related to their 
programmes and activities. Member companies of the FLA and ETI, to a varying extent, 
make use of the global audit ﬁrms described above, most of whom have actually been 
accredited by SAI. FWF and WRC thus far are the only ones to consistently advocate 
a different approach. Having said that, they have proven to be useful as a means of 
“raising the bar” of companies, by providing members with a chance to listen to the 
experiences of their peers and to advice from trade unions and NGOs. 
Participation in an MSI can help get a company with little experience or existing capac-
ity on code compliance onto the right track, since membership of an MSI usually stipu-
lates that a company must take certain ﬁrst steps.
The MSIs mentioned above have also come together in the “Joint Initiative on Corpo-
rate Accountability and Workers Rights” which aims to evaluate and test the different 
approaches towards code implementation thus far, and hopes to contribute towards 
more collaborative work. The CCC also participates in the steering committee of the 
project, which will test the various approaches in trials in Turkey.76 
MSIs can also provide a form of independent oversight or veriﬁcation of code imple-
mentation. This has long been a key demand made by labour rights advocates, includ-
ing the CCC. Because the essence of veriﬁcation is credibility, it must be performed by 
organisations or individuals that are independent of the enterprises or organisations 
whose claims are being veriﬁed (for instance the claims of sourcing companies, sup-
pliers, trade or industry associations, etc.). This is where the potential role for those 
MSIs who have NGO and trade union representation in their boards, comes into play. 
Veriﬁcation can involve the same or similar activities that may have been used to im-
plement a code—inspections, interviews, complaints, social audits, factory audits, etc. 
or it may involve the re-examination of evidence acquired from these activities. 
Transparency is commonly considered key to effective veriﬁcation. 
Veriﬁcation can be carried out in relation to a speciﬁc situation at a workplace or it 
could concern an examination of management systems and other evidence that will 
indicate whether an enterprise or organisation (a sourcing company for instance) has 
assumed the responsibilities that it claims. 
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86 AMRF Alternative Movement for Resources and Freedom SocietyANSRU  National Association of Human Resources SpecialistsAVE Export Trade Association of the German Retail Trade 
BSCI Business Social Compliance Initiative
CCC Clean Clothes Campaign
CEC  Centre for Education and Communication 
COVERCO Commission for the Veriﬁcation of Codes of Conduct
CSCC Cal-Safety Compliance Corporation 
CSR Corporate Social Responsibility
DTI-GTEB  Philippines Department of Trade and Industry represented by  
 the Garments & Textile Board
ETI Ethical Trading Initiative
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
EU European Union
FCD  Fédération des entreprises du Commerce
FFC Fair Factory Clearinghouse
FLA Fair Labor Association
FTA Foreign Trade Association
FWF Fair Wear Foundation
GMIES Grupo de Monitoreo Independiente de El Salvador.
GTZ German Ministry of Development Co-operation 
HKCIC Hong Kong Christian Industrial Committee 
ICFTU International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
ICS Initiative Clause Sociale
ILO International Labour Organisation
ISO International Standardisation for Organisation
ITGLWF  International Textile, Garment, Leather Workers Federation 
JOIN Joint Initiative on Corporate Accountability and Workers’ Right
LARIC Labor Rights in China 
MNE Multinational Enterprises 
MSI Multi-stakeholder initiative
MSN Maquila Solidarity Network
NGO Non-governmental organisation
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PILER Pakistan Institute of Labour Education and Research
PwC PricewaterhouseCoopers 
SA8000 Social Accountability 8000
SAI Social Accountability International
SAVE Social Awareness and Voluntary Education
SEA  Social Environmental Affairs
SEDEX Social Ethical Data Exchange
SGS  Société Générale de Surveillance
SPTSK  Textile, Clothes and Leather Factory Trade Union 
UCM Urban Community Mission
VGT Vereniging of Grootwinkel Bedrijven 
WFSGI World Federation of the Sporting Goods Industries
WRAP Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production
WRC Worker Rights Consortium
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“I have been working [here] for more than a year. 
Auditors visit the factory but there is no visible 
change in our working conditions [...] I have been 
having a constant leg pain since I joined. I have 
complained to the supervisors but have not got 
time off to see the doctor.” Worker, factory D, north India, 
producing for Wal-Mart, Kellwood and Sears  “[Supervisor’s 
name] is present at the time of the interview so 
we get to know who was interviewed and what was 
asked. We hold meetings with the workers, train 
them, before the audit. We tell them what may be 
asked and what should be answered.” Manager, Factory 
A, north India, producing for BCL, Saki and RCC  “No worker 
who had met the social auditor could be identiﬁ ed. 
According to the information collected...supervisors 
were interviewed by the social auditors.”  Factory 
A, producing for BCL, Saki and RCC  “I propose that if social 
organizations, like yours, trade unions and the 
inspectors of the buyers audit together, things for 
the workers may change. But my fear is that when 
and if that happens, at the time of the inspection the 
employers will lock their units and proper auditing 
will be made impossible. The system needs to be 
changed.” Md Ateeq, President, Delhi Leather Karigar Sangathan 
Trade Union, India

